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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 2158 (2014), in which the Council requested me to keep it informed of the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) every 120 days. The report covers major developments that occurred from 1 May to 31 August 2014.

II. Political and security developments

A. Political situation

2. Overall, there has been positive progress on the political track, albeit punctuated by some worrying developments. In May and June, tensions between State institutions threatened to derail political progress when a group of parliamentarians petitioned the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to resign. They accused him of failing to implement the Federal Government's six-pillar policy, now known as "Vision 2016", and of not consulting widely. The President's address to the Federal Parliament on 16 June helped to defuse the situation.

3. The Federal Government issued a revised version of Vision 2016 (a plan for the political transformation of Somalia) on 30 June. It is committed to the implementation of the plan with wider Somali buy-in.

4. The formation of regional administrations began gathering pace. On 23 June, the Federal Government brokered an agreement on south-west Somalia between the two rival political initiatives based in Baidoa to establish an interim south-west administration, encompassing the regions of Bay, Bakool and Shabelle Hoose. Ethiopia, as chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), signed the agreement as a witness, while UNSOM, the African Union, the European Union and the IGAD special envoys signed as observers. Key figures in the six-region state initiative continue to oppose the agreement, however. The Federal Government, the parties to the agreement and supporting elders plan to launch a reconciliation initiative later in 2014 to promote an inclusive process.

5. There were positive developments in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 August 2013. The militia leader, Barre Adan Shire ("Hiralle"),

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returned to Mogadishu from the outskirts of Kismaayo on 30 August. About 118 members of his militia also returned and surrendered their weapons to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Kismaayo reconciliation conference will open on 16 September and the selection process for the Juba regional assembly will run in parallel with it.

6. In the central regions, the Federal Government held consultations with representatives of the "Regional State of Galmudug", the "Administration of Himan and Heeb" and the leadership of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah. This led to the signing of an agreement on 30 July by which those entities, with the exception of the "Administration of Himan and Heeb", committed themselves to forming an administration for Mudug and Galguduud in a consultative and inclusive manner. The United Nations, the European Union, IGAD and the African Union signed the agreement as witnesses. The "Himan and Heeb" leaders signed on 6 August. The process of selecting a technical committee is under way. The Federal Government is also consulting on the creation of an interim regional administration for the Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe regions.

7. Tension in the disputed Sool region grew when "Somaliland" forces seized the town of Taleex on 12 June and disrupted a conference organized by leaders, elders and supporters of the self-declared "Khatumo State". The tension escalated when the Government of Puntland reinforced its military presence in the contested region. On 26 June, "Somaliland" forces withdrew from Taleex, leaving behind a pro-"Somaliland" Dhulbahante militia. The "Khatumo" leaders relocated to Saaxdheer, an area in the Sool region near the Ethiopian border, from where one of the "Khatumo" founders and a parliamentarian, Ali Khalif Galayr, was elected the new President of "Khatumo" on 14 August. On 27 August, "Somaliland" forces captured Saaxdheer and have since occupied the area.

8. Although relations between the Federal Government and Puntland remained strained, some ministerial visits and technical meetings were conducted in relation to the New Deal Compact process. On 21 May, the Government of Puntland hosted a donor round table in Garoowe in which the participants, including the Federal Government, discussed the development priorities of Puntland and its participation in the New Deal aid architecture. Subsequently, Puntland dispatched ministerial delegations to the meeting of the Steering Committee of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility on 12 June and to the executive meetings of the High-level Partnership Forum on 9 May and 12 June, in Mogadishu. Relations faced a setback, however, when, on 31 July, the Puntland authorities announced a freeze on all cooperative relations and activities with the Federal Government in reaction to the signing of the agreement on state formation in Galguduud and Mudug without consultations with them. On 18 August, the Government of Puntland offered a 30-day consultation period between Garoowe and Mogadishu in an effort to resolve differences.

9. Progress was made in the constitutional review process. On 29 May, the Council of Ministers approved the nominations of five individuals to serve as commissioners on the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission. The Federal Parliament approved the nominations on 19 June. The Commission is a body of legal and technical experts that will focus on the drafting of proposed constitutional amendments under the political supervision and guidance of the parliamentary Provisional Constitution Review and Implementation Oversight Committee.

10. On 30 June, the Federal Parliament passed the Judicial Service Commission Law. The Commission is the supreme administrative organ of the Somali judiciary and is a prerequisite for the establishment of a constitutional court as the country's highest court. The Commission's most important responsibilities include appointing, promoting, transferring, dismissing and disciplining the members of the judiciary.

11. In line with Vision 2016, an ad hoc parliamentary electoral committee was established on 19 May to draft a bill on a national independent electoral commission and to review comparative electoral systems. It draws members from both the Federal Parliament and the Federal Government. It has yet to agree on the legislation to establish the commission. The legislative agenda for the coming parliamentary session is crowded and, according to Vision 2016, the lower chamber of the Federal Parliament is expected to endorse the bill in November.

12. "Somaliland" continued to prepare to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015. The authorities there are looking into the legal framework for the voter registration process and replacing the current electoral commission, whose mandate expires on 29 October. Meanwhile, the opposition political parties have vowed not to accept any delay in holding the elections.

13. Following an invitation by "Somaliland", my Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, visited Hargeysa on 18 and 19 August. The visit opened a new chapter in relations between the "Somaliland" authorities and UNSOM, with the former expressing interest in engaging with UNSOM in the areas of good offices, rule of law, human rights, media capacity-building and gender mainstreaming.

B. Security situation

14. The overall security situation in Somalia remains volatile. In Mogadishu, the number of incidents attributed to Al-Shabaab abated during May and June, but incidents during Ramadan increased as expected. On 24 May, Al-Shabaab fighters stormed the Federal Parliament building. Three AMISOM and 11 Somali troops were killed, while more than 20 others were injured, including a parliamentarian. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility and vowed more attacks against the Federal Government and those it termed "invaders", including the United Nations.

15. In July, Mogadishu experienced a surge in targeted assassinations. The victims comprised members of the Somali security forces and civilians, including two parliamentarians. Small-scale explosions also increased. On 8 July, Somali troops foiled a complex attack inside Villa Somalia at the early stages of its execution. Another attack at the Federal Parliament building on 5 July failed when Somali police officers fired at a suspicious vehicle, which detonated, killing the suicide bomber and five officers. On 30 August, Al-Shabaab attacked a National Intelligence and Security Agency prison in Mogadishu, resulting in the deaths of seven attackers and three Agency personnel.

16. Following the attack of 8 July, the Federal Government replaced several senior security officials, including the Minister of National Security, the Police Commissioner and the Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Agency. After Ramadan, AMISOM and the Somali security forces launched a series of disarmament operations in Mogadishu in an attempt to improve the security situation.

17. In southern and central Somalia, Al-Shabaab continued to exert pressure. In the Galguduud and Hiraan regions, it intensified guerrilla activities around the former strongholds of Ceel Buur and Buulobarde. On 26 June, insurgents carried out a complex attack against a Djiboutian base in Buulobarde, killing two Somali troops.

18. While Shabelle Dhexe was comparatively quiet, Shabelle Hoose remained volatile, in particular around Afgooye, Marka and Qoryooley. Clan conflict between Biimaal and Habar Gidir militias also resurfaced, with fatal clashes, abductions and killings reported every week in June and July.

19. On 10 May, Waajid, Bakool region, experienced its first terrorist attack since being recovered by AMISOM and the national army, when an explosion outside a restaurant caused five casualties. On 12 May, a suicide car bombing in Baidoa, Bay region, killed 19 bystanders and injured 13 others. On 27 May, fierce fighting between Al-Shabaab, AMISOM and clan militias in Ato, Bakool region, resulted in more than 40 reported fatalities.

20. Kismaayo remained relatively calm, although underlying clan tensions sporadically escalated into armed violence among the Interim Juba Administration security forces. Kenyan forces launched air strikes in support of AMISOM around Jilib, Juba Dhexe, on 18, 20 and 24 May and 16, 22 and 24 July, as well as around Badhaadhe, Juba Hoose, on 21, 23 and 24 June.

21. Puntland experienced fresh Al-Shabaab activities. On 8 May, Al-Shabaab fighters clashed with Puntland security forces in Feloja, Bari region. On 4 August, the Police Commissioner for the Bari region was killed in a suicide bombing in Boosaaso and, on 7 August, the Chair of the Military Court survived an assassination attempt along the road between Garoowe and Boosaaso, in the Galgala area. In Gaalkacyo, two roadside bombings and three grenade attacks in July confirmed the presence of Al-Shabaab supporters in the town.

III. United Nations support to peace consolidation

A. Good offices and political support

22. My Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, continued to provide advice and good offices to the Federal Government on state formation. He advocated the resumption of cooperative relations between the Federal Government and Puntland and encouraged the leadership of the Federal Government to visit Puntland. On 17 and 18 August, he visited Garoowe and met the President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, and senior officials, in addition to holding consultations with traditional leaders and civil society groups, including women and young people.

23. My Special Representative also met the Minister for Foreign Affairs of "Somaliland" in London and the President of Puntland in Nairobi, urging the two sides to reduce tensions and seek a political solution through dialogue. Coordinating closely with international partners, he also engaged with the various parties to state formation in south-west and central Somalia in support of the Federal Government's efforts to establish inclusive processes. On 20 May, for example, he met leaders of the six-region state initiative in Mogadishu to urge them to support the process led by the Federal Government that is bringing together all the parties.

24. Members of the Security Council made a landmark visit to Somalia on 13 August to review progress made by the Federal Government and to demonstrate the international community's continued support for the country's efforts to achieve sustainable peace.

B. Support to peacebuilding and State-building

Development of a federal system and constitutional review/democratic politics and governance

25. The United Nations continued to provide strategic policy advice in support of the state formation process in Somalia. UNSOM provided support to the Kismaayo reconciliation conference, working closely with the technical committee to create a road map for state formation.

26. In support of the Federal Government's progress towards the implementation of Vision 2016, UNSOM and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with support from the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, deployed a chief electoral adviser and a senior electoral affairs officer to Somalia. Their role is to provide technical advice to the Federal Government and UNSOM leadership on electoral priorities and legislation.

27. UNSOM and UNDP are providing advice and technical support to the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission. The United Nations provided funds for the renovation of the office building for the Commission and was represented at a technical retreat organized by the Federal Government to devise a workplan for the Commission.

Security sector and rule of law

Security sector reform

28. UNSOM supported efforts to align international assistance for a national security architecture framework with the consultative process led by the Federal Government, which includes the President and Prime Minister. The focus is on the areas of counter-insurgency, joint intelligence analysis, arms and ammunition management and maritime security, including coordination structures within the regions.

29. UNSOM conducted a baseline survey of small arms and ammunition in Mogadishu in support of the Federal Government. Its results were included in the Federal Government's report to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea. The survey was extended to the army facilities in Beledweyne and Baidoa. A meeting of the Arms and Ammunition Steering Committee of the Federal Government was held on 27 August in Mogadishu.

30. Licences for 25 private security companies expired in June, but the Federal Government extended the licence of a company used by the United Nations for convoy services in Mogadishu until 25 October. In this regard, UNSOM submitted a draft development framework for a diplomatic police unit to the Federal Government for consideration.

31. UNSOM participated in the AMISOM after-action review of Operation Eagle, held in Addis Ababa on 28 and 29 May. AMISOM, with support from UNSOM, continues to provide refresher training, especially on human rights, with more than 5,500 army personnel having been trained to date.

32. The Defence Policy Working Group, led by officials from the Ministry of Defence, developed a draft defence strategic plan for the period 2014-2016 and submitted it to the Federal Government for review and finalization. UNSOM participated in a security sector reform meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, held on 10 July, to align its work for upcoming meetings, one in London on security sector reform and the other in Copenhagen on the High-level Partnership Forum.

33. Joint efforts by UNSOM and the World Bank to assist the Federal Government to undertake a public expenditure review of the security sector progressed with the preparation of technical assessments in the areas of public financial management, funding flows and the political, security and justice context.

Disengaging fighters

34. Supported by UNSOM, the Ministry of National Security convened on 10 July in Mogadishu the first meeting of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Working Group. It was attended by representatives of Member States, AMISOM and implementing partners, such as the International Organization for Migration, the Serendi Rehabilitation Centre and the International Development Law Organization. The participants agreed upon the importance of the continued implementation of the national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants and expressed the need for a revision based on the new realities.

35. UNSOM supported the opening and occupation of the rehabilitation facility in Baidoa. It is also coordinating efforts to establish the first transitional facility for female disengaged Al-Shabaab members in Baidoa.

Police

36. The United Nations rule of law team, comprising UNSOM and United Nations country team staff, continued to support the Ministry of National Security in implementing peacebuilding and State-building goal 2 of the Somali Compact. Police working group meetings were held on 6 May and 24 July. Eight strategic planning team members were hired to support the Somali police in the implementation of the strategic action plan for the period 2013-2017 devised by the Ministry and the police.

37. From 1 to 5 June, UNSOM and AMISOM jointly facilitated a human rights training-of-trainers course for 25 Somali police officers. The twenty-second stipends payment cycle for police officers in southern and central Somalia was completed. Nearly 1,000 police officers in southern and central Somalia remain to be registered.

38. On 13 June, the Government of Japan approved the use of $4.5 million from the Trust Fund for Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia for a police utility, mobility and infrastructure project. United Nations police officers, through the joint global focal point arrangement, supervised the rehabilitation of four police stations and handed over the rehabilitated Boosaaso central police station on 20 July. UNSOM also secured funding to build an operations centre within the police headquarters and equipment to permit the police to be operational at all times.

39. UNSOM is currently supporting the Somali police in the recruitment of some 500 cadets in Mogadishu. The UNSOM rule of law team, with support from the United Nations Office for Project Services and with government stakeholders, began rule of law infrastructure assessments in southern and central Somalia to inform future programming support for construction and rehabilitation projects under the proposed joint rule of law programme.

40. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit of the Somali police, supported by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), responded to 935 call-outs and identified and destroyed 996 items of unexploded ordnance in Mogadishu and Baidoa. UNMAS, with funds from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is equipping and training officers to provide the Somali police with improvised explosive device defeat capacity. The team will be operational by the end of 2014. Teams from AMISOM formed police units from Nigeria and Uganda were trained by UNMAS in explosive ordnance disposal, enabling joint AMISOM and Somali police operations to be conducted in Mogadishu.

Justice and corrections

41. The UNSOM rule of law team continued to support the implementation of peacebuilding and State-building goal 3 of the Somali Compact, in particular by strengthening the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs through the recruitment of 28 Somali advisers and by supporting legal policymaking and the drafting of key priority laws. Coordination of international assistance continues, with support provided for the development of the Somali rule of law programme priorities, which were endorsed by the Steering Committee of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility on 31 August. This provides the foundation for the development of the joint rule of law programme for 2015-2016, to be funded from the Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia.

42. A pilot project at the Banadir Regional Court complex in Mogadishu is under way to put in place measures to provide essential security arrangements for judicial actors through infrastructure improvements and protection by police and custodial corps officers. As part of continuing advocacy efforts for a moratorium on the death penalty and the application of fair trial standards, UNSOM began discussions with the newly appointed Chief Justice of the Military Court and continued to garner support from international partners.

Maritime security

43. On 30 June 2014, the President of Somalia issued a proclamation to define the country's exclusive economic zone, including a list of geographical coordinates of points defining the limits of that zone. One State has objected to the limits. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal States have sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone with regard to natural resources and some economic activities and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection.

Mine action

44. UNMAS continued to provide technical advice and financial support to the Somali Explosive Management Authority and the mine action centres in "Somaliland" and Puntland, supporting national capacity to coordinate explosive

hazard management throughout Somalia. It provided training on how to mark weapons and keep records to 10 army personnel from 3 to 8 June, supporting the Federal Government in increasing transparency and accountability in accordance with the modified arms embargo.

45. Battle area clearance by UNMAS resulted in the destruction of 749 items of unexploded ordnance, thereby preventing their use in improvised explosive devices. From 28 April to 1 May, UNMAS conducted training of trainers for police officers in Kismaayo on explosive ordnance disposal and improvised explosive device awareness.

46. UNMAS facilitated 15 joint Somali police and AMISOM explosive dog detection searches, including, and at the request of the Federal Government, pre-emptive venue and vehicle searches in Kismaayo, Baidoa and Mogadishu. All United Nations Guard Unit personnel received awareness training on improvised explosive devices as part of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) training package.

C. Human rights and protection

Human rights

47. UNSOM initiated a process to harmonize the support provided by the United Nations to the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, while continuing to offer technical assistance to the Ministry on the implementation of the post-transition human rights road map and the establishment of an independent human rights commission. UNSOM provided technical assistance in the form of training to the Puntland parliamentary committee on human rights and supported the establishment of the Office of the Human Rights Defender in Puntland.

48. In July and August, nine people were executed by firing squad in Mogadishu after having been found guilty of terrorism and murder in the military justice system. To date in 2014, 14 people have been executed by the Federal Government. UNSOM has continued to raise concerns over due process and the quality of justice delivered by the military courts.

49. Civilians continued to suffer human rights violations and abuses linked to conflict in many regions of southern and central Somalia. A human rights assessment carried out in Shabelle Hoose indicated that 75 civilians had been killed and 14 women raped during inter-clan fighting in May and June. In July, inter-clan violence in the Hiraan region reportedly resulted in the deaths of at least six civilians. In both situations, soldiers from the national army were involved in the fighting.

50. In Mogadishu, more than 10,600 internally displaced persons received eviction notifications during the reporting period. Most have already been evicted. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the people concerned were notified orally of the impending eviction in almost all cases. Internally displaced persons were forcefully evicted mainly from public land that is now claimed by private persons in the districts of Hodan, Xamar Jajab, Wadajir, Shibis and Xamar Weyne.

51. More than 2,980 Somalis were deported to Somalia from Saudi Arabia from May to July, while 198 Somalis were deported from Kenya to Mogadishu by air in May. UNHCR further recorded six cases of refoulement of registered refugees and asylum seekers and sought their readmission to Kenya on their behalf.

52. Al-Shabaab reportedly carried out at least 21 public executions during the reporting period, notably in the Bay and Bakool regions, of people whom they accused of either spying for the Federal Government or breaking regulations that the group had imposed in areas under its control.

53. As attacks continued in Mogadishu, public officials and media workers were among those targeted. On 21 June, a well-known journalist, Yusuf Keynan, was killed in an attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. On 25 July, another prominent journalist, Mohamed Abdullahi Haji, survived a similar attack. UNSOM has expressed concern about continuing violations of the right to freedom of expression, in particular in the context of the forced closure of media outlets and the detention of journalists.

Child protection

54. A total of 166 cases of grave violations affecting 154 children (112 boys and 42 girls) were documented.

55. The children and armed conflict working group co-chaired by the country task force on monitoring and reporting and the Ministry of Defence held its bimonthly meeting on 14 April and discussed the establishment of a child protection unit within the army. On 27 May, the Ministry nominated members of the unit at the headquarters level, with military liaison officers for the sectors to be identified subsequently. A mobile screening team was set up on 14 May to systematically screen army and police units in order to separate any children found. On 29 June and 12 July, 250 soldiers and 900 new recruits were screened at Jazeera Training Centre. No children were found.

56. From 16 to 21 August, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, visited Somalia and Nairobi. She met the President, the Prime Minister and key ministers, who reiterated their commitment to implementing relevant action plans on children and armed conflict, supporting the global campaign "Children, Not Soldiers" and ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child. She also met senior officials of UNSOM and AMISOM, the Interim Juba Administration in Kismaayo and the United Nations country team and visited a reintegration centre supported by the United Nations Children's Fund and the Serendi Rehabilitation Centre.

Gender mainstreaming and empowerment of women

57. On 3 May, my Special Representative met 12 women civil society representatives, including journalists and students, to discuss their views on the political situation and the future of Somalia. They raised concerns about preparations for the elections to be held in 2016, the security situation and the delays in political processes, such as state formation and constitutional review.

58. On 24 June, a workshop was jointly organized and led by UNSOM and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in Mogadishu with 40 women civil society leaders from the Banadir, Puntland, Bay,

Juba Hoose, "Galmudug", Galguduud and Hiraan regions to plan their involvement in the upcoming political processes. The event was preceded by meetings within each of the regions to discuss best practices and lessons learned. In closing the workshop, the President reiterated his support for the promotion of women into leadership positions. As a result of the workshop, a core group of women civil society leaders, within the framework of the Somali Women Leadership Initiative, have been meeting UNSOM weekly to review the mobilization and management of women's participation in political processes.

59. On 19 July, UNSOM and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women supported the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development in undertaking consultations for the 20-year review of the Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women. The event was attended by 60 participants from civil society and the Federal Government and will result in a comprehensive report on the situation of women in the 12 areas of concern of the Platform. The Ministry also continued its efforts to coordinate support for the finalization of the national gender policy and submitted a draft action plan for consideration by donors on 23 July.

Sexual violence in conflict

60. The Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development used the report of the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict as the evidential base for tackling sexual violence in Somalia. The Ministry, with the support of the United Nations and the Government of the United Kingdom, held consultations from 12 to 17 May on four themes: civil society, service delivery, uniformed services and access to justice. They were aimed at reaching agreement on aims and objectives with all government line ministries and hearing the views of those delivering front-line services.

61. Following the consultations, the Federal Government developed a national action plan on sexual violence in conflict that is fully aligned with the New Deal Compact and agreed upon by multiple government line ministries, including those of defence and justice, the army and the police. Civil society organizations were extensively consulted. The Federal Government presented the draft plan, which will be finalized following regional consultations, to the international community during the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, held in London from 10 to 13 June. The progress made was welcomed by the key actors, the United Nations and the donor community, with pledges made to support the implementation phase.

D. Humanitarian situation

62. Somalia is experiencing one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world. About 3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, including an estimated 1.1 million people internally displaced by recurrent droughts, floods and conflict. Some 73,000 people have been displaced by insecurity since March, following the launch of the first joint army and AMISOM military operations against Al-Shabaab. Most have not yet returned to their place of origin.

63. After two years of incremental improvements, the food security situation in Somalia has, according to projections by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit — Somalia, seriously deteriorated. For the first time since the famine of 2011,

the number of people who cannot meet their daily food needs over the coming six months has increased from 857,000 to 1.1 million. This is due to drought, continued conflict, the restricted flow of commercial goods in areas affected by military operations, increasing malnutrition and surging food prices. Drought conditions were present in southern, central and north-eastern Somalia from July, with overall rainfall recorded at less than half of normal levels during the main rainy season (from April to June).

64. Acute malnutrition levels have also increased, in particular in parts of the north-west, southern and central regions. There are more than 218,000 acutely malnourished children in Somalia, of whom 44,000 are severely malnourished and at risk of death. Overall, 3 in 4 acutely malnourished children are found in southern and central Somalia, many living in areas in which road access is blocked by armed groups. The most alarming malnutrition rates have been observed among displaced communities, with global acute malnutrition rates up to 18.9 per cent (the emergency threshold is 15 per cent) in seven urban displacement settlements: Dhobley, Doolow, Dhuusamarreeb, Garoowe, Gaalkacyo, Kismaayo and Mogadishu.

65. The outbreak of measles has persisted, with around 6,000 suspected cases reported between January and July, more than double the number of cases in the same period in 2013. In some areas in central and southern Somalia, immunization coverage is as low as 15 per cent owing to access and funding constraints. Intensive vaccination campaigns notwithstanding, four new cases of wild polio virus were confirmed in 2014, bringing the number of those affected to 198 since the outbreak began in May 2013, most of them children. If drought conditions persist, the already-high incidences of diarrhoea and other diseases will increase as people are forced to resort to unsafe water sources.

66. Violence and conflict continue to take a heavy toll on civilians, mainly in southern and central Somalia. In May and June, some 1,200 weapon-related injuries were treated in eight hospitals in Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Mudug and Baidoa, with more than 100 deaths reported.

67. Humanitarian access remains difficult, given that high levels of insecurity prevail in most districts of southern and central Somalia. Access to the newly recovered towns has relied heavily on air services, which renders humanitarian action expensive, unreliable and unsustainable.

68. The challenging operating environment notwithstanding, aid organizations continued to provide assistance during the reporting period. Some 1.4 million people received food and livelihood relief, with 97,000 children treated for malnutrition. Almost 500,000 people were supported with temporary or permanent access to safe water and 160,000 people were provided with latrines. Another 315,000 people were supported with hygiene promotion packages. Some 500,000 people were provided with essential health services, with a campaign to vaccinate 520,000 against measles conducted in July and August. In addition, 3.4 million children under 5 years of age were vaccinated against polio in May and June. Some 15,000 people received emergency assistance packages and household items, including plastic sheeting, blankets and mattresses, while 54,000 others were provided with transitional shelter. Around 4,400 survivors of protection violations were provided with support, with 383 children formerly associated with armed groups benefitting from community-based reintegration programmes. With regard to education, 232,000 learners were supported through teacher training and incentives. Humanitarian partners also assisted 155 separated and unaccompanied children, including those deported from Saudi Arabia.

69. On 19 August, the Prime Minister conducted the first visit of a Somali prime minister to the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. A day earlier, the participants in a ministerial-level meeting on Somali refugees, held in Addis Ababa and attended by UNHCR, my Special Representative for Somalia and ministers from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Yemen, which together host nearly 1 million Somali refugees, reaffirmed the commitment of host countries to finding solutions. The participants welcomed the provision of asylum space to refugees and agreed that conditions for mass return had not yet been met in Somalia.

E. Stabilization

70. Efforts to establish caretaker administrations and provide urgent security, livelihood and humanitarian assistance continued. In July, the Federal Government reported that training for all caretaker administrations had been completed through the Somalia Stability Fund in partnership with the Government of Sweden. Administrations have been established in Xuddur, Waajid, Warsheikh, Qoryooley and Buulobarde. However, access remains a key obstacle to deploying the remaining administrations and delivering other stabilizing assistance.

71. International planning and coordination also continued. At the strategic level, the President convened an inaugural high-level meeting with representatives of AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOA and government officials on 16 August to review planning for the second phase of operations, including stabilization activities. A proposal for $3.5 million from the Peacebuilding Fund was finalized in partnership with the Federal Government and submitted to the Peacebuilding Support Office for appraisal and approval.

F. Socioeconomic recovery and development

72. On 29 May, the Financial Governance Committee held its third meeting in Mogadishu, the first at which all six members were present. Secretariat support provided through the World Bank arrived on 7 June, enabling the Committee to identify technical assistance requirements and initiate more systematic communication with key stakeholders and the Somali public. On 12 June, the Steering Committee of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility welcomed its progress. On 16 July, the Committee released a progress report in which it highlighted key achievements, including the endorsement of the procurement amendment bill and the audit bill by the Council of Ministers, the preparation of financial statements by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance and the Committee's review of six concession contracts with technical input from the World Bank and the African Development Bank. On 17 July, the Federal Government requested the Committee to oversee and monitor the future national asset recovery programme, in close cooperation with the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative.

73. Efforts are under way to strengthen the role of Somalia in the global trading system. On 17 June, the Prime Minister signed a formal request to the executive secretariat of the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries to include Somalia in the programme. The Enhanced Integrated Framework promotes the mainstreaming of trade into the development agenda of least developed countries and allows access to international trade-related technical assistance through Aid for Trade programmes.

G. Targeted sanctions

74. During the informal consultations of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, held on 15 May, the Somali National Security Adviser provided a briefing on the efforts of the Federal Government to meet the requirements of resolution 2142 (2014) and implement the recommendations of the assessment mission that I deployed to Somalia pursuant to paragraph 10 of the same resolution. The Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is finalizing its report on Somalia and will present its findings to the Committee early in October.

H. Coordination of international efforts

75. Executive meetings of the High-level Partnership Forum were held on 9 May and 24 June, co-chaired by the President and my Special Representative. The need for urgent delivery on the New Deal Compact commitments and for improvement in the transparency of international assistance was emphasized. The Steering Committee of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility held meetings on 12 June and 31 August, chaired by the Prime Minister. Discussions focused on current aid flows to Somalia and the engagement of States and regions in the implementation of the Compact.

76. Sector-level coordination continued through the working groups on the peacebuilding and State-building goals. They are currently finalizing their planning frameworks and identifying key gaps and support needs until 2016.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2124 (2013)

77. As one of its priorities, UNSOM continues to work with its partners on implementing the human rights due diligence policy in Somalia. It provided human rights input into pre-deployment training for AMISOM contingents in Bujumbura and Kampala. It also provided training in human rights and international humanitarian law to AMISOM, the army and the police in Mogadishu and Baledogle, Shabelle Hoose. It is finalizing the risk assessments of AMISOM and the army while continuing to monitor the human rights situation in the newly recovered areas.

78. Somali troops have also been undergoing "fit for combat" training, which includes a module on human rights and humanitarian law, delivered by Ethiopian and Djiboutian trainers in sectors 3 and 4. In total, 2,747 and 1,000 troops have been trained in sectors 3 and 4, respectively. Other troops also underwent training in sectors 1, 2, 5 and 6.

Logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia and the army

79. UNSOA continued to provide its logistical support package to AMISOM and the army, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2124 (2013) and the revised AMISOM concept of operations. Owing to bad weather and insecure major supply routes, UNSOA had to deliver rations by air to forward locations in sectors 2 to 5, putting considerable pressure on UNSOA utility air assets and restricting air movements for other tasks. UNSOA put in place the arrangements necessary to support the second joint AMISOM and army offensive, "Operation Indian Ocean", which began in the last week of August.

80. UNSOA also continued its engineering and construction work in all sectors in support of AMISOM, including constructing accommodation and offices, defence walls and level II medical facilities, drilling wells for water and providing sanitation facilities. It completed terrestrial trunked radio tactical communication hubs in sectors 2 and 4 and at the sector Kismaayo headquarters. In addition, it provided pre-deployment, in-mission and other training support to 562 AMISOM personnel, bringing the total number of personnel trained since April 2009 to 9,476.

81. UNSOA supported and participated in the joint verification of Ethiopian troops in sectors 3 and 4 in July. AMISOM also participated. Relief in place operations between sector 2 and sector Kismaayo have not been completed owing to concerns that are currently being dealt with by the African Union Commission. The rotation of Sierra Leonean troops that was initially scheduled to begin in July 2014 was postponed owing to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in Sierra Leone.

82. UNSOA operates hub-and-spoke air services with fixed-wing aircraft between the six sector hubs and helicopters within each sector. The air logistics support concept is based on a centralized operations system, with the main logistics bases in Mogadishu, and decentralized execution, feeding the other five sector logistics/tactical hubs (Baidoa, Beledweyne, Kismaayo, Jawhar and Dhobley). This is augmented by administrative and medical/casualty evacuation support from Nairobi. In total, UNSOA has deployed nine utility helicopters and three fixed-wing aircraft. Currently, six helicopters are based in Mogadishu, one in Wajir (Kenya) and two in Baidoa. There are also two fixed-wing aircraft in Mogadishu and another in Nairobi. UNSOA plans to deploy a C-130 heavy cargo aircraft to meet new demand for transportation of rations, supplies and cargo.

83. As a component of the UNSOA logistical support package, UNMAS continued to provide explosive management training, equipment and mentoring to joint AMISOM and army operations in southern and central Somalia. In July, it facilitated the deployment of AMISOM explosive ordnance disposal teams to Jawhar to clear the Afgooye-Marka road, which had been prone to improvised explosive device attacks against AMISOM and the local population. A convoy route survey, in the context of explosive hazards, was provided for the delivery of rations to Beled Amin in the Bay region and Marka and facilitated the movement of several hundred AMISOM troops from Mogadishu to Jawhar. UNMAS provided medical backup to AMISOM explosive ordnance disposal teams and facilitated medical care for the army, AMISOM and the local population in Shalambot in Shabelle Hoose and Beled Amin.

84. During the reporting period, support to the army was mainly focused on assisting it to meet the preconditions for UNSOA logistical support, in line with resolution 2124 (2013).

85. UNSOA has to date spent $2.1 million of the total contributions of $8.3 million to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali National Army. An amount of $1.627 million has been earmarked for the purchase of critical supplies for the army. In addition to contributions from the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, some $750,000 has been pledged by the Governments of Ethiopia and New Zealand. The contributions still fall below the estimated $19.6 million required for the initial year, however. The balance in the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM currently stands at $4 million, following the recent contribution by the Government of Australia of $1 million.

V. United Nations presence in Somalia

Expansion of the presence

86. The reoccupation of international compounds along the road to Mogadishu International Airport, closed after the attack of 19 June 2013, began on 24 April with the United Nations common compound. Over the period, in-country staff figures averaged 330 international staff and 990 national staff, with an average of 190 international staff in Mogadishu. Of those staff, the UNSOM deployment strength stands at approximately 60.

Integration

87. The integrated strategic framework, which also serves as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, was endorsed by the United Nations presence in Somalia at a United Nations country team retreat held on 3 July. It was further fine-tuned in discussion with the United Nations Development Group and the donor community before being formally endorsed by the Integrated Task Force on Somalia in New York on 27 August. The final step in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework process is the presentation of the integrated strategic framework to the Federal Government in September.

Staff safety and security

88. During the reporting period, there were no significant security incidents affecting United Nations staff, programmes or assets. Security within Mogadishu International Airport was bolstered with the deployment of the United Nations Guard Unit, the advance elements of which arrived on 6 and 7 May. The Unit's first-phase deployment of 332 personnel within the main compounds at the airport was completed on 15 June. The second-phase deployment of 78 personnel was completed on 8 and 9 July, thereby achieving the mandated strength of 410 troops. The second-phase personnel are to deploy to the proposed new UNSOM headquarters. The amendment to the status-of-mission agreement, aimed at facilitating the Unit's operations, remains under negotiation with the Federal Government. Memorandums of understanding are also under negotiation with the African Union and the Federal Government, aimed at coordinating the Unit's operations with those of AMISOM and the Somali security forces.

VI. Observations

89. As we approach the midpoint of the four-year term of the Federal Government in September, I remain cautiously optimistic about progress in the political process, the many risks ahead notwithstanding. International attention and support will continue to be critical as the Federal Government and people of Somalia work towards their shared goals of State-building and peacebuilding. The historic visit of the Security Council in August has given a strong signal of the sustained commitment of the international community to supporting the process.

90. The past months have seen growing momentum towards realizing the vision of Somalia as a federal State. I welcome Vision 2016, which has helpfully clarified the roles of federal institutions in the process and set out key principles of inclusiveness, transparency and Somali ownership, in addition to clear timelines. I

welcome the agreement to establish an interim south-west administration and the agreement of intent to form an interim administration for Galguduud and southern Mudug. I call upon the Federal Government to ensure that the processes are further developed in an inclusive manner, in line with the provisional Federal Constitution, and encourage all stakeholders to engage. I am concerned that progress could be jeopardized by current inter-clan tensions, in particular in Shabelle Hoose, and urge all parties to seek a peaceful solution to their concerns within the context of the federal vision as a whole. I welcome the commitment of the Interim Juba Administration to a fully inclusive State-building process. I encourage the parties to the Addis Ababa Agreement to swiftly implement outstanding commitments, especially holding a reconciliation conference and integrating militias operating outside Kismaayo.

91. Time is now extremely tight to realize the constitutional review and electoral preparations if the deadline of 2016 is to be respected. Unity among federal institutions will be crucial. The Federal Parliament has a critical role to play and the coming parliamentary session will be decisive if the benchmarks in Vision 2016 are to be met. I welcome the formation of the Independent Constitution Review and Implementation Commission and encourage the Federal Parliament to move swiftly also to form a boundaries and federation commission. A broad-based constitutional review process should get under way rapidly, fully involving the regions of Somalia and addressing critical federal issues, including the future structure of the security sector.

92. I am especially concerned about the slow progress in electoral preparations. An independent national electoral commission must be established without delay if the target is to remain within reach. I encourage Somali and international partners to work together in a coordinated manner to support the development of credible, transparent institutions capable of administering an electoral process.

93. The recent escalation in tensions between Puntland and "Somaliland", including the deployment of military forces in the border areas, is of concern. I repeat my earlier calls upon the two parties to exercise maximum restraint and to take steps towards de-escalating the situation. My Special Representative continues to engage the parties through his good offices, in coordination with regional and international partners.

94. I commend the continued efforts of the army and AMISOM to advance military operations against Al-Shabaab, including through the launch of "Operation Indian Ocean". They have shown great courage and perseverance in the face of extremely dangerous conditions. I urge Member States to assist AMISOM in deploying the air assets authorized in resolution 2124 (2013) and to contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali National Army as soon as possible.

95. It is essential that military operations be followed immediately by efforts to establish or improve governance structures in the recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security. Failure to consolidate the gains in those areas could also derail the broader political process. I call upon the international community to rally behind the Federal Government to meet this urgent priority.

96. I am extremely concerned that the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. After the gradual rebuilding of livelihoods since the famine of 2011 that cost more than a quarter of a million lives in excess mortality, fragile gains are now being eroded and malnutrition rates are again on the rise. The difficulties in access

notwithstanding, humanitarian agencies have been able to reach some of those in need, but are constrained by their lack of resources. The consolidated appeal for 2014 remains severely underfunded, at just 32 per cent (a gap of $637 million). I urge partners to help to fill the gap and caution that a humanitarian crisis in Somalia would be likely to severely hamper hard-won gains on the political and security fronts.

97. Securing the main supply routes is critical to offering safe access for civilians, commercial activities and humanitarian actors, to peacebuilding and to enabling the efforts of UNSOA, which is doing its utmost to support the operations. I support the President's calls for the military operations to accord priority to this task.

98. I welcome the steps taken by the Federal Government to comply with the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council, including implementing the recommendations made in my letter of 3 April to the President of the Council (S/2014/243). I encourage partners to support efforts to develop the capacity of the Somali authorities in this regard and urge the Federal Government to continue and enhance its compliance efforts. Meanwhile, I am concerned about the continuing export of Somali charcoal in violation of the ban imposed by the Council in its resolution 2036 (2012) and request the Federal Government, AMISOM and recipient countries to coordinate their efforts to implement the ban.

99. I urge the Federal Government to tighten financial governance procedures, in particular regarding funding flows relating to the security sector. I am encouraged that a joint public expenditure review of the security and justice sector by the World Bank and the United Nations is in progress.

100. I am extremely concerned about the targeted killings of Somali public officials, including five legislators, two judges and 31 police officers. I urge the Federal Government to investigate all criminal activities and bring the perpetrators to justice.

101. I remain concerned about the human rights and protection situation in areas affected by conflict, including as a result of inter-clan violence. I am particularly concerned about reports of grave violations against women and children. I again urge the Federal Government to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols thereto. I also urge the Somali authorities to implement a moratorium on the death penalty.

102. I continue to be concerned about the underrepresentation of Somali women in peacebuilding, especially in the current process for the formation of regional administrations. I urge the Somali authorities not to miss the current opportunity to ensure the full representation of women in political processes, in line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). Special attention should be given to supporting women in the newly recovered areas, where they will play a key role in rebuilding war-torn societies. I call upon the Somali authorities to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

103. I pay tribute to my Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, his deputies and the members of staff of UNSOM, UNSOA and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other international and regional organizations in Somalia for their continued hard work under challenging conditions. I also thank the African Union, AMISOM, IGAD, the European Union and other development partners for their sustained support to the search for peace in Somalia. We must continue to strengthen our partnership in the quest for lasting peace and stability.



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10.2 UNITED NATIONS
May 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2014/700

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my report on Burundi (S/2014/550) in which I informed the Security Council of the preparations for the establishment of a United Nations electoral observer mission, immediately after the end of the mandate of the United Nations Office in Burundi, pursuant to Council resolution 2137 (2014).

In this regard, I would like to inform you of my intention to deploy immediately an advance team to commence preparations for the establishment of the mission. The advance team will ensure that the mission is fully operational on 1 January 2015, in accordance with the expectations of the Council.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the Members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2014/701

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 25 September 2014 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 23 September 2014 (S/2014/700), concerning your intention to deploy immediately an advance team to commence preparations for the establishment of a United Nations electoral observer mission in Burundi, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Samantha Power
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2014/702

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 25 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011), 2074 (2012) and 2123 (2013), I have the honour to convey the attached letter dated 11 September 2014, which I received from H.E. Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, transmitting the thirty-eighth report on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex). The report covers the period from 1 March to 31 May 2014.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 11 September 2014 from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011), 2074 (2012) and 2123 (2013), please find enclosed the thirty-eighth three-monthly report on Operation Althea to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Catherine **Ashton**

Enclosure

Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Introduction

1. The present report covers the period from 1 March to 31 May 2014.

2. In its resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011), 2074 (2012) and 2123 (2013), the Security Council requested that Member States, acting through or in cooperation with the European Union, report to the Council on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) at least at three-monthly intervals. This is the thirty-eighth such report.

II. Political background

3. The reporting period was marked by extensive floods in mid-May 2014, which caused one of the largest natural disasters on record in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to 1 million people were affected. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina participated in a strong effort undertaken by the civilian authorities in response to the humanitarian crisis. EUFOR/Operation Althea supported the country's authorities in filling a critical gap during the lifesaving phase. The European Union and its member States, as well as other international partners such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are in the lead in terms of providing assistance during the recovery. The disastrous floods exacerbated the country's socioeconomic challenges, while also revealing encouraging signs of solidarity among the population.

4. General elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be held on 12 October 2014. Ethnocentric politics and narrow party interests continued to dominate the political agenda. Election-related political calculations increased the use of inflammatory and divisive political rhetoric.

5. In April 2014, following the visit of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 11 March, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions supporting broad European Union engagement with the country and urging the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to respond to the needs of citizens. In addition, the Council endorsed initiatives to improve economic governance, strengthen competitiveness, stimulate economic growth, address rule-of-law issues and accelerate the implementation of European Union-funded projects.

6. On 26 and 27 May 2014, in order to tackle the socioeconomic needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina that had sparked the February riots, the European Union, together with international partners and participating international financial institutions, organized a "forum on jobs and prosperity". The forum allowed for an in-depth discussion about necessary socioeconomic reforms and launched the process for

formulating the "Compact for Growth", a package of key economic reforms for the country. It is of great importance that the leaders and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina support and vigorously implement the outlined agenda.

7. The comprehensive approach promoted by increased cooperation between the European Union Special Representative and Operation Althea has proved, once more during the humanitarian crisis, its added value in terms of both increased effectiveness of European Union reaction and demonstrated commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

III. Security situation and activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

8. The overall security situation remained calm and stable during the reporting period. Owing to the flooding, the socioeconomic situation deteriorated significantly, and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina must address this.

9. Since the February riots, efforts to improve coordination with law enforcement agencies have continued; indeed, the authorities have identified and openly admitted the need to improve communication, cooperation and coordination among all police bodies.

10. Operation Althea continued its main effort in the area of capacity-building and training, while retaining the means to support the authorities' efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment as "second responder".

11. The four home-based companies required as intermediate reserves were available throughout the period. As from 1 May 2014, Slovakia also contributed an intermediate reserve company. Therefore, EUFOR now has five intermediate reserve companies available until the end of 2014, during the election period.

12. The over-the-horizon reserve force, comprising one Italian infantry battalion, reduced its readiness from 14 to 7 days mission ready in theatre until the end of the year to cover the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. No strategic reserve force has been identified.

13. During the floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR has provided substantial assistance to the country's authorities by conducting more than 300 air evacuation flights in order to rescue more than 1,000 persons in immediate danger caused by floods, and by delivering tons of essential supplies. There have also been more than 30 EUFOR truck convoys delivering, inter alia, water, food, blankets, clothes, shelter and generators to assist people in flooded areas.

14. Floods and landslides have displaced mines as well as warning signs, which will pose an increasing risk both to assistance personnel and to the local population. EUFOR and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre are currently working to identify areas of displaced mines.

IV. Outlook

15. Work is ongoing to assess how much the safety conditions at the weapons and ammunitions storage sites may have been affected by the flooding and to re-map the now potentially mine-contaminated areas that had previously been cleared.

16. The overall security situation has remained calm and stable. Concerns exist that the socioeconomic environment remains a serious problem, in particular the possible perception that disaster relief actions are not reaching the affected population equally. This may have the potential to lead to situations that could threaten the safe and secure environment.

17. Given the election-related increased use of inflammatory and divisive political rhetoric, as seen in previous election periods, a close link between EUFOR and the law enforcement agencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly around the time of the election and during the government formation period, will be crucial to ensure adequate situational awareness and responsiveness.

United Nations S/2014/703

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 25 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 25 September 2014 from the President of the Syrian Coalition, Hadi al-Bahra (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah **Al-Mouallimi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 25 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition), I am writing to call your urgent attention to reports of a series of appalling attacks carried out against a vulnerable population of Syrian refugees perilously trapped in camps in the Lebanese town of Arsal, near the border with Syria.

During the early hours of Thursday, 25 September 2014, elements of the Lebanese armed forces entered refugee camps located in Arsal, reportedly to conduct a counter-terrorist operation. Credible reports, however, indicate that Lebanese Army personnel, acting alongside sectarian elements, terrorized the camps' population of displaced Syrian refugees. Resident witnesses describe Lebanese armed forces setting fire to and destroying homes, attacking innocent women, children and elderly residents, and detaining residents en masse.

The Syrian Coalition warned the international community of the possible escalation of the situation in Arsal as a result of the worsening humanitarian situation and previous violent attacks. In a letter dated 4 August 2014 the Coalition's Special Representative to the United Nations, Najib Ghadbian, raised the issue of the violence in Arsal and urged the Security Council to take immediate action to protect the lives of Syrian citizens seeking refuge from the ongoing conflict in their home country. The letter also called upon the international community to ensure the Lebanese Government holds to account those responsible for the unacceptable actions. The international community has a responsibility to address the humanitarian situation and security conditions in Arsal as a matter of urgency.

We again call for immediate and decisive action to protect the population of innocent refugees in Arsal and other camps located near the Syria-Lebanon border. We urge that:

(a) The United Nations urgently investigate the latest incident and report to the Security Council swiftly on circumstances leading to the incident, culpability and recommendations for next steps;

(b) The Security Council authorize an expansion of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) explicitly to provide protection for the refugees;

(c) Should the Security Council fail to authorize an expansion of the mandate of UNIFIL, that the United Nations deploy permanent observers into the refugee camps to monitor and report on the situation and to act as a deterrent against unacceptable treatment.

Syrian refugees face an intolerable situation. It is critical that they not be subjected to further trauma and violence when they seek refuge outside Syria from the tyrannies of Assad and ISIS inside Syria. It is critical that the United Nations use its good offices to ensure that any issues or incidents inside the refugee camps are addressed in a proportionate and responsible manner by countries accommodating our people.

(*Signed*) Hadi **al-Bahra**
President of the Syrian Coalition

United Nations S/2014/704

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 25 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to draw your attention to the discovery of a mass grave on 23 September in a coal mine, Komunar, near the village Nyzhnia Krynka (60 km from Donetsk). The unmarked graves contain several partially decomposed corpses in civilian clothes. It is clear that these people were executed, as evidenced by the victims' hands tied behind their backs, marks of shots in the head and the 9mm cartridge cases which were found near the bodies. This discovery was registered by the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe special monitoring mission to Ukraine, and relevant information was included in their daily update of 23 September.

Existing evidence suggests that these civilians were cold-bloodedly killed by the Ukrainian armed forces. In particular, there are reports that two days before the discovery of the mass grave, this area was left by the members of the 25th paratrooper brigade of the Ukrainian armed forces and the Aidar battalion which had exercised control over it for a considerable period of time.

I would kindly ask you to circulate the present letter to the members of the Security Council and to issue it as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

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United Nations A/69/411–S/2014/705

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 October 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 69 (a)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 26 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to convey to you the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014) (S/2014/696):

1. The approach adopted in the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014) continues to ignore the realities of and the developments in the situation in Syria. The report continues to describe armed terrorist groups as "armed groups" or the "armed opposition", although the international community has affirmed that these groups are terrorist entities. Indeed, the Security Council recently adopted resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014) to counter the threat posed by these entities. The report's authors also continue to distort the facts and politicize humanitarian issues, and refuse to acknowledge the vast progress the Syrian Government and United Nations humanitarian agencies have made in meeting the humanitarian needs of Syrian civilians. The report also strayed significantly from the mandate established for the Secretary-General. It addresses issues that are far removed from the humanitarian situation, such as the situation that was facing the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the question of the use of chlorine. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic finds it deplorable that the report fails to mention the humanitarian catastrophe that occurred on Tuesday, 16 September 2014 in the countryside of Idlib governorate, when fictitious health institutions affiliated with armed terrorist groups conspired, with the cooperation of the Turkish authorities, to kill 15 innocent Syrian children by

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administering expired vaccines to them. Dozens of other innocent children suffered from asphyxiation as a result of this crime.

2. Since 2011, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, in keeping with its constitutional and humanitarian responsibilities, has marshalled all its resources to meet the essential needs of those citizens who have been affected by the crimes committed by armed terrorist groups. It has done so despite the tremendous price the Syrian State has paid as a result of the acts of terrorism that have been systematically directed against its institutions and infrastructure. In that regard, it reaffirms its readiness to continue to cooperate with the United Nations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all affected Syrian citizens, without discrimination. It also abides by the letter and spirit of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014), in accordance with the sequence of steps specified in Security Council resolution 2165 (2014) and the understanding reached in the Security Council in that regard, and on the basis of respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law, the guiding principles for humanitarian emergency assistance annexed to General Assembly resolution 46/182 and, above all, the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria that was reaffirmed in Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014).

3. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that, in order to resolve the humanitarian crisis that has developed in many parts of Syria, it is essential to address the roots of the problem and the factors that are exacerbating it. In particular, this means countering and eradicating terrorism that is being backed by Arab States, as well as States of the region and beyond. Indeed, in its resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014), the Council acknowledged this link and stressed the importance of countering and eradicating terrorism. In that connection, it is regrettable that, in its reports, the Secretariat continues to ignore the fact that armed terrorist groups are primarily responsible for the ever-worsening humanitarian crisis in Syria. It insists on addressing the humanitarian situation in Syria in a manner that is selective, biased, politicized and contrary to the facts on the ground, and that disregards the guiding principles of United Nations humanitarian assistance. The report's authors also insist on using the designation "the armed opposition" for terrorist groups that have been classified by the Security Council as being terrorist entities associated with Al-Qaida. These groups include the Nusrah Front and its allies, as well as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its allies. The authors furthermore insist that they are incapable of verifying whether "foreign fighters" are present in Syria. Such a position contradicts the report itself, which confirms that thousands of foreign fighters are present, and the relevant Security Council resolutions, the most recent of which are resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014).

4. The authors' insistence that "ISIL is a consequence, not a cause, of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic" is contrary to the facts on the ground and the relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014). This position also ignores the fact that the terrorist group ISIL came into being as a result of the American and Western invasion of Iraq and that it spread from there to Syria and other countries. We are therefore surprised by the manner in which the report addresses the question of ISIL, because Syria has stressed, since the events in the country began, that ISIL was a terrorist organization. It had also stressed that ISIL and the Nusrah Front, along with their ally Al-Qaida, were present in the country from the outset, and that they were the cause, not a consequence, of

the Syrian crisis. The decision of the Secretariat and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to deliberately ignore the terrorism that is being directed against Syria with the support of Arab States, as well as States of the region and beyond, and their continued lack of attention to the crimes committed by armed terrorist groups undermines the credibility of these reports and those responsible for them. It also impedes, both directly and indirectly, the vital role that the United Nations is expected to play, in complete impartiality and without regard for political considerations, in countering and eradicating terrorism and holding accountable those who support, fund and arm terrorists.

5. The Syrian Government believes that the Organization's policies must be in line with its Charter, international law, the conditions governing humanitarian work, General Assembly resolution 46/182 and Security Council resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014), both of which affirmed the priority of combating terrorism and terrorist organizations, including ISIL, the Nusrah Front and associated groups. The Government notes that in order for certain States to demonstrate they sincerely wish to counter terrorism, they must desist from providing funding, arms and training to terrorist organizations and from smuggling terrorists into the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Humanitarian work must be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and should not exclude any party. Such work must not be conducted under the aegis of States that have funded and armed terrorists and smuggled them into Syria, including terrorists affiliated with ISIL, the Nusrah Front and other terrorist groups. These terrorists come from 83 different States, a fact that was acknowledged by the Heads of those States of which the terrorists are nationals in the statements they made at a meeting of the Security Council held at the summit level on 24 September 2014. Syria has declared its readiness to cooperate at the international and regional level in countering terrorism through an international or regional alliance that would be established under the auspices of the United Nations. It is also prepared to engage in bilateral cooperation to that end and supports any international effort aimed at countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, provided that, in doing so, every effort is made to safeguard civilian lives, respect national sovereignty and adhere to international instruments.

6. The Syrian Government has repeatedly stated that medical relief supplies brought into Syria should conform to the standards of the Ministry of Health of the Syrian Arab Republic and the World Health Organization. In order to safeguard the lives of civilians, Syria has also stressed that the Syrian Arab Red Crescent must be the primary partner in the distribution of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance, directly to beneficiaries throughout the country, including difficult-to-reach areas and hotspots. Lack of cooperation and coordination in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance, and the exclusion of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent from the distribution process gave rise to a crime, indeed, a humanitarian catastrophe on Tuesday, 16 September 2014. This catastrophe came about through the connivance of fictitious health institutions affiliated with armed terrorist groups and the Turkish Government, and resulted in the death of 15 innocent Syrian children. They died after they were given expired, poisoned measles vaccine that was obtained from unknown sources. The incidents occurred in an area to the east of Ma'arrat Nu'man in the countryside of Idlib governorate, which is located in the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, dozens of innocent children suffered from asphyxiation as a result of this crime against humanity. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic finds it deplorable

that the report fails to mention this humanitarian catastrophe, although it occurred in the reporting period.

7. The Government reiterates that the success of humanitarian work depends on cooperation and transparency on the part of the United Nations. The Organization should also desist from criticizing the Government's actions without cause and reject conduct on the part of certain United Nations officials that encroaches on Syria's sovereignty and undermines the Syrian State. The Government furthermore warns that the acute funding shortfall in the humanitarian response plan is one of the greatest challenges and obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected persons in Syria. As of September, only 31 per cent of the funding required for the humanitarian response plan had been secured. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has provided us with a document that indicates that it has received only $63 million, or 23 per cent, of its $270 million assistance budget to date.

8. The Syrian Government deeply regrets that the United Nations, represented by the World Food Programme (WFP), intends to reduce the size of the food parcel it provides by 40 per cent, that is to say, by nearly half, although it will continue to deliver assistance at the current high rate. This means that the contents of the new food basket will not be sufficient to meet the needs of a beneficiary family for more than 15 days. In addition, basic items were removed from the parcel to save costs, but at the expense of being able to meet the essential needs of beneficiary families. While the Government appreciates the efforts made by WFP to deal with this reduction, which was brought about by an acute funding shortfall caused by efforts to politicize and undermine humanitarian work, it calls on the United Nations to be forthright and draw attention to this challenge and to stop blaming the Government without cause. The Government is also gravely concerned at information it has received that certain donor States, in line with their political agendas, intend to break up humanitarian work and direct funding to cross-border assistance. Should such an action be taken, it would constitute an inhumane act of discrimination that is contrary to the guiding principles that govern humanitarian work. It would also establish a precedent with disastrous consequences for the humanitarian work the United Nations performs around the world, and adversely affect those civilians suffering as a result of the crisis in Syria.

9. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is dismayed that, for political motives, senior United Nations officials have cited arbitrary estimates and inaccurate and undocumented figures on humanitarian needs in Syria in their statements and reports. Such conduct adversely affects the credibility and precision of information related to humanitarian work. This is the case with many of the reports on the Syrian crisis issued by the United Nations, including the report being discussed. This report cites information taken from unsubstantiated testimony and reports issued by anti-Syrian parties, including in particular the reports of the international commission of inquiry for Syria and Human Rights Watch, which are characterized by politicization and lack of objectivity. The Government has previously informed the Resident Coordinator for United Nations activities in Syria that it deplores such irresponsible conduct.

10. During August 2014, the distribution of food aid was extended to a total of 4,160,000 beneficiaries throughout Syria. That outcome was made possible not by the small number of trucks that have crossed the border, but rather by the close

cooperation and coordination between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and WFP, not to mention the Government's significant action to facilitate the delivery of aid from within Syrian territory. By cooperating with the Syrian Government, the United Nations has been better able to access numerous areas that have been variously described as besieged or hard to reach. This shows yet again that the centre of gravity for aid distribution remains Damascus.

11. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is surprised that the United Nations side has delivered humanitarian assistance across borders to areas that had previously been reached from within Syrian territory, and has done so at very close intervals. The United Nations must coordinate aid delivery with the Syrian Government, including aid delivered across borders in areas where it has had limited reach. Doing so is important in order to ensure that aid is not delivered twice to the same beneficiaries, and to avoid wasting time, efforts and funds. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic therefore stresses that the Resident Coordinator must supervise all relief operations, including those involving the importation of assistance across the borders, in coordination with the Syrian Government. Such a course of action would ensure the implementation of the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 2165 (2014), the application of the fundamental principles governing the work of the United Nations in crises and respect for the sovereignty of Syria, as reaffirmed by the resolutions of the Security Council. It would also ensure that aid distribution is not subject to Western agendas that benefit those States, rather than the Syrian people.

12. The Syrian Government has continued, whenever possible, to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations to access many hard-to-reach areas in Rif Dimashq, the eastern and western parts of the Aleppo countryside, Idlib and the countrysides of Dar'a, Homs and Hama. In addition, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent delivered humanitarian assistance to those areas in the period from 23 August to 22 September 2014.

- In cooperation with the Syrian Government and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delivered humanitarian assistance from within Syrian territory to over one million beneficiaries in July and August 2014, as detailed in the report compiled by ICRC. It was also able to deliver medical assistance to hotspots in Aleppo and its countryside and in Rif Dimashq.

- An emergency response was organized in order to address the displacement of families from Qunaytirah governorate to the Qatna district of Rif Dimashq owing to terrorist attacks. Some 4,925 families were displaced during the period from 7 to 17 September 2014. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent sent medical teams and mobile clinics, treating 718 ill persons and providing 1,000 food parcels in addition to non-food supplies and health-care supplies on 7 September 2014.

- On 22 September 2014, humanitarian assistance convoys were deployed to Hulah (Kafr Laha) and Ghawr in the countryside of Homs governorate. Some 700 food parcels were distributed in Hulah district and 2,500 in Ghawr district, in addition to children's food.

- On 12 September 2014, humanitarian assistance was delivered to Dar'a governorate; 1,300 food parcels and the same number of health-care parcels

were distributed in Tafas, and 800 food parcels and the same number of health-care parcels in Shajarah.

- From 2 to 8 September 2014, some 2,000 food parcels were distributed in Idlib governorate and 825 in Hama governorate.
- An agreement has been reached to incorporate hotspots into monthly humanitarian assistance distribution plans for Idlib and Hama governorates. Action has been taken to facilitate the access of aid convoys to the two governorates. The affected districts include Qah, Badama, Saraqib, Jisr al-Shughur, Armanaz, Sarmin, Ariha and Darkush in the Idlib countryside, and Aqrab, Tallaf, Dayr al-Faradis, Qal'at al-Madiq, Ba'rin, Humayri, Khirbat Jami', Rawdah, Tama'inah, the area to the east of Hama, and Muhradah in the Hama countryside.
- On 10 September 2014, medical assistance was delivered to medical centres in the towns of Tafas, Jasim, Nawa, Harak, Basr al-Harir, Nahitah, Mulayhah, Nimr and Harah in Dar'a governorate.
- On 5 September 2014, some 1,000 food parcels were delivered to families in Yabrud, Rif Dimashq governorate.
- On 9 September 2014, medical supplies, including medicine for chronic diseases, child vaccinations and milk for children, were delivered to the town of Duma, in Rif Dimashq governorate.
- On 27 August 2014, the towns of Yabrud and Busra al-Sham received 2,000 and 1,000 food parcels respectively.
- The Syrian Government has agreed to the Resident Coordinator's request for an assistance convoy to Hirista, in Rif Dimashq. The details are to be agreed upon soon by the relevant joint committee.
- On 23 September 2014, the Syrian Government announced that it had approved the request submitted by the United Nations on 21 September for relief supplies to be brought in through the Nusaybin crossing from 29 September.
- The Syrian Government regrets that, for the third time, the United Nations failed to deliver assistance to Adra al-Ummaliyah and Adra al-Balad, whereas the national authorities responsible for relief have recently been able to reach the latter.
- Until 19 September 2014, despite ongoing attacks, assistance continued to be delivered to Yarmouk camp, which is besieged from within by armed terrorist groups. Some 8,028 food parcels and 874 health-care parcels were distributed, bringing the totals since the beginning of the year to 50,166 food parcels and 6,949 health-care parcels. Some 21 ill persons were transported out of the camp and taken to hospitals in Damascus, bringing the total number of ill persons evacuated from the camp since the beginning of the year to 4,485. The medical facility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continued to treat patients at the distribution site and provide them with medication. A Palestinian civil society organization has continued to vaccinate children at the distribution point. What the report fails to mention is that the terrorist groups have prevented humanitarian teams from accessing distribution points and have opened fire on civilians and relief teams.

- The Government has agreed to instruct officials at the border crossings of Nasib, Jadidah, Yabus and Nusaybin and the ports of Ladhiqiyah and Tartus to facilitate procedures to deliver humanitarian assistance in the context of the procedures currently in force. The decision was taken in response to a request from the United Nations. The Syrian Government will continue to cooperate with the United Nations to address any problems in the procedures regulating the movement of relief convoys as long as international agencies continue to abide by the fundamental principles governing humanitarian work, the most important of which is respect for national sovereignty, in order to facilitate the movement of relief supplies and ensure that they reach their destination and beneficiaries as soon as possible.

- The Syrian Government has given approval to the Swiss non-governmental relief organization Medair and continues to examine other applications.

- The United Nations delivered humanitarian assistance to Mu'addamiyah in July 2014. What the Organization witnessed inside the city confirms that it is not under siege, and that the 4,000 civilians who remained in the Darayya area have been able to reach Mu'addamiyah, contrary to the claims made in the Secretariat's reports concerning the two areas, including the report under consideration. The latter does not refer to facts on the ground, something that raises questions regarding its credibility.

13. With regard to the matter of visas, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would like to note that, in the reporting period, it granted the requested entry visas for international officials. The Government hopes that this matter will be settled through cooperation between Syria and the relevant United Nations organizations.

14. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is surprised that the report yet again fails to apportion blame clearly and explicitly to the armed terrorist groups. Throughout the crisis, the groups have made it their practice to deliberately and systematically sabotage and destroy the infrastructure, services and public and private property, including hospitals, schools, homes and Islamic and Christian places of worship. Their objective is to harm Syrian civilians and their State, to hurt the economy and to bankrupt the Syrian State.

15. The Syrian Government notes that it has informed the United Nations side of the situation of a number of local staff members who had been imprisoned on charges of terrorism. Those individuals have been handed over to the competent judicial authorities. The Government is therefore surprised that the United Nations refers to them as detainees.

16. The Syrian Government reiterates its keen concern for the security and safety of aid workers affiliated with the United Nations and its agencies. The Syrian Government stresses that it must be informed sufficiently in advance of the importation of humanitarian assistance into its territory so that it may take the necessary measures to ensure the delivery of such assistance and also to ensure the security and safety of humanitarian agency personnel. The monitoring mechanism established pursuant to resolution 2165 (2014) must ensure that cross-border humanitarian assistance is distributed to the affected Syrian civilians who need it, and that it does not fall into the hands of the terrorists. It is not enough to state that

the goods were searched when they were loaded hundreds of kilometres from the distribution zones.

17. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is surprised that the report once again ignores the negative effects that unilateral coercive measures have had on the lives of the Syrian people. In order to tackle the humanitarian crisis in Syria, terrorism must be fought and the unilateral economic and financial sanctions that have affected the lives of Syrian citizens must be lifted. Some of the States that claim concern for the fundamental principles of human rights are the very same ones that imposed the illegal sanctions. The Syrian Government notes that the most recent report of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs on the world economic situation states that unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States of America and its allies have harmed the living conditions of Syrian civilians and their ability to meet their own basic needs.

18. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic rejects the claims made in the Secretary-General's report that the Syrian armed forces are indiscriminately targeting civilians. The Syrian Arab Army has fulfilled its constitutional role and moral duty by protecting its citizens from armed terrorist groups and preventing them from committing crimes against Syrians in their homes, schools, universities, hospitals, mosques, churches and places of work. Those crimes have also affected foreign journalists, UNDOF peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance convoys. At the same time, the Syrian Government is earnestly striving to reach a political solution and bring about national reconciliation. This is Syria's national strategy.

19. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is surprised at the position of the report regarding what it refers to as ceasefire agreements. National reconciliation agreements have restored peace, security and stability to numerous parts of Syria, sparing the lives of thousands of innocent Syrian civilians. The report's sceptical position is therefore deplorable. By insisting that the agreements should not be supported, the report gives the impression that the United Nations wants the crisis to continue and spread uncontrollably across the country, something that would endanger international peace and security.

20. At the Geneva conference, the Syrian Government emphasized the importance of prioritizing counter-terrorism and achieving national reconciliation in order to arrive at a political solution under Syrian leadership. In order to do so, it is essential to recognize the aspirations of the Syrian people as expressed with particular clarity in the multi-candidate presidential elections held within and beyond Syria in June and July 2014. The elections were monitored by parliamentarians from around the world and by media outlets from over 40 countries.

21. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic repeats that it supports any international effort to combat terrorism in all its forms, manifestations and names. In accordance with international conventions, such efforts must protect the lives of civilians and respect national sovereignty and unity. The Security Council must help Syria restore security by calling on the international community to stop interfering in internal Syrian affairs and focus on countering and suppressing terrorism, incitement thereto and the financing thereof. Security Council resolutions 2133 (2014), 2170 (2014) and 2128 (2014) confirm the soundness of Syria's call for serious efforts to root out terrorism and halt the funding, arming, training, sheltering and smuggling of terrorists.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 69 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar Ja'afari
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/706

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Letter dated 26 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the twelfth monthly report of the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations from 23 August to 22 September 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

I am pleased to note the further progress that has been made in the destruction of declared chemical weapons materials of the Syrian Arab Republic in designated facilities outside the country. I am also pleased to note that preparations are under way to commence the destruction of the remaining 12 chemical weapons production facilities. It is essential that any remaining concerns regarding the initial declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic be addressed promptly and transparently, and I welcome the continued engagement between the Syrian Arab Republic and OPCW in that regard.

As I stated in my letter dated 25 August 2014 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/622), the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic will be brought to a close on 30 September 2014. OPCW is finalizing arrangements with the United Nations Office for Project Services to enable OPCW to continue its remaining inspection and verification activities inside the Syrian Arab Republic beyond that date.

As I also noted in my letter, I will continue to exercise my good offices in furtherance of the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), including by providing any required support for overall coordination and liaison with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and other relevant actors and stakeholders. In order to ensure continuity, I have asked the Special Coordinator for the Joint Mission, Sigrid Kaag, to continue to assist me in that regard.

I am very concerned at the findings presented in the second report of the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, in response to allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in that country. I strongly condemn any such use by any party to the conflict. I reiterate my call for the perpetrators of any such acts to be brought to justice.

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Please recycle

With the impending closure of the Joint Mission, I should like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to the Special Coordinator and all staff of the Joint Mission, both international and national, who have worked tirelessly, in difficult and often dangerous circumstances, towards the elimination of the declared chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should also like to pay tribute to the more than 30 Member States and organizations that mobilized and contributed significant financial and in-kind contributions in furtherance of resolution 2118 (2013), including Member States that contributed to and participated in the multinational maritime transport operations. The operation was enormously complex and fraught with difficulties. I find the dedicated support of so many partners within the international community to be an excellent example of constructive multilateralism. It has demonstrated what can be achieved through sustained political will and unity of purpose.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme" prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 August 2014 to 22 September 2014 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet Üzümcü

Enclosure

Note by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the twelfth such monthly report.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 August to 22 September 2014.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

4. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. As reported previously, all declared chemicals have been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, while all declared stocks of the Category 1 chemical isopropanol have been destroyed within the Syrian Arab Republic. Progress achieved within the current reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling other obligations is described below:

(a) In accordance with the Council's decision on the combined plans for the destruction and verification of 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) in the Syrian Arab Republic (EC-M-43/DEC.1, dated 24 July 2014), as announced in the previous monthly report (EC-M-44/DG.2, dated 25 August 2014), a meeting was held in Beirut from 4 to 10 September 2014 between the Secretariat, representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) (which is going to procure the required services, equipment, and materials), as well as commercial companies. The latter included representatives of a company identified by the OPCW to provide specialist technical advice to the Syrian Arab Republic and two companies identified by the Syrian Arab Republic which, if selected, will undertake destruction activities. Representatives of potential explosives and chemicals supplying companies were also consulted. The discussions led to the conclusion that the

chemical expansion destruction method was not a viable method. Experts agreed that the three aircraft hangars expected to be initially destroyed "using chemical expansion destruction method, if feasible", could be destroyed using a combination of controlled detonation and mechanical destruction. With regard to the time frame, should the explosives be supplied accordingly and the contracts with the services and equipment providers be concluded under acceptable conditions for the OPCW, it is expected that the destruction activities will commence in October 2014 and that the first CWPF will be destroyed by 30 November 2014. A further meeting is planned from 24 to 26 September 2014 in Beirut with a view to streamlining the tasks, modalities, and costs incurred.

(b) On 12 September 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a detailed plan for the destruction of the CWPF that was declared on 14 July 2014 as a result of the work of the Declaration Assessment Team. The plan has been submitted to the Council for consideration at its Seventy-Seventh Session (EC-77/P/NAT.2, dated 12 September 2014).

(c) Following the submission by the Syrian Arab Republic of a destruction plan for the two items declared by its Government as abandoned chemical weapons, the Secretariat submitted a draft decision on the agreed detailed plan for the verification of their destruction (EC-M-44/DEC/CRP.1, dated 25 August 2014), together with the report (EC-M-44/P/S/1, dated 25 August 2014). However, consideration of these documents was deferred until a later session of the Council.

(d) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs. The tenth such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 17 September 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-77/P/NAT.3, dated 14 September 2014).

(e) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the Joint Mission in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

5. Following the complete removal of identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 June 2014, destruction activities are nearing completion. The following subparagraphs provide information on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons on board the United States vessel MV Cape Ray, at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, and at facilities sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2 (dated 17 December 2013):

(a) As reported previously, destruction operations on board the MV Cape Ray were completed on 18 August 2014. All liquid waste produced by the hydrolysis of the declared chemicals DF and HD was pumped directly into ISO tanks on the ship. The MV Cape Ray has now delivered the DF effluent to Ekokem's

facility in Riihimäki, Finland, and the HD effluent to the GEKA facility in Münster, Germany, for disposal, and has now completed its involvement in the operation.

(b) As at the cut-off date of this report, 100% of the received Category 1 and 2 chemicals had been destroyed by Ekokem in Finland. Of the DF effluent delivered by the MV Cape Ray on 30 and 31 August 2014, a total of 4% had already been destroyed.

(c) As at the cut-off date of this report, Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC in the United States of America, the other commercial facility selected alongside Ekokem through the tender process organised by the OPCW, had destroyed 60% of the received chemicals.

(d) As reported in the previous monthly report, the Secretariat verified the completion of destruction activities at Veolia Environmental Services (UK) as announced by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 7 August 2014. Destruction activities at Mexichem UK Limited are planned for late 2014.

(e) The HD effluent produced by the neutralisation process on board the MV Cape Ray was delivered to the port of Bremen in Germany on 5 September 2014 and transported from there to the GEKA facility. As at the cut-off date of this report, 4.5% of the effluent had already been destroyed.

6. Taken together, the destruction activities described in subparagraphs 5(a) to 5(e) above mean that, as at the cut-off date of this report, 100% of the Category 1 chemicals and 87.8% of the Category 2 chemicals had been destroyed, representing a combined total of 97.6%, including the isopropanol previously destroyed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will continue to provide such information during briefings to States Parties in The Hague and through the monthly reports. Timelines for the completion of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons were provided in the overall report on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme (paragraph 25 of EC-76/DG.16, dated 4 July 2014), which was noted by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

7. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organisations and between the offices in The Hague, New York, Damascus, and Cyprus. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission, Ms Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. Ms Kaag briefed the Forty-Fourth Meeting of the Council on 28 August. As at the cut-off date of this report, two OPCW staff members were deployed as part of the Joint Mission in Damascus, and one logistics officer in Beirut.

8. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties hosting a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat has continued to provide regular information briefings to States Parties in The Hague on behalf of the Director-General.

9. As reported in document EC-77/S/3 (dated 12 September 2014), the Secretariat has received a number of communications from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding attempts by certain armed groups to manufacture and use toxic substances against civilians and the Syrian Arab Army. These include the chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as abandoned chemical weapons and taken possession of from armed groups (see subparagraph 4(b) above); the origin of these items has yet to be established. Samples collected during the hydrolysis of DF and sulfur mustard agent on board the United States vessel MV Cape Ray have been transported to the OPCW Laboratory. Similarly, samples of the Syrian chemical materials being destroyed at commercial facilities have been retained under OPCW seal at those facilities, with the intention to transport them to the OPCW Laboratory. As another confidence-building measure in the joint efforts to eliminate the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat has sought the consideration and decision of the Council to retain, at the OPCW Laboratory, samples of chemicals from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic for future reference, if so required. The Secretariat intends to retain the samples referred to in this paragraph, pending a decision by the Council. A draft decision on this matter has been submitted to the Council for consideration and approval at its Seventy-Seventh Session (EC-77/DEC/CRP.2, dated 12 September 2014).

10. As stipulated by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session (paragraph 6.17 of EC-76/6, dated 11 July 2014), the Secretariat and the Syrian authorities continue to cooperate on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian declaration. The latest meeting took place in Beirut from 17 to 19 September 2014. At the Seventy-Seventh Session of the Council, the Secretariat will make a follow-up presentation for States Parties on the activities of the Declaration Assessment Team, coupled with a report to States Parties on the activities of the Team, which will also be made available to delegations at the same session. The consultations on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian declaration continue.

11. OPCW inspectors are carrying out periodic inspections at the commercial facilities to verify destruction activities and also observed the off-loading of the DF and HD effluent from the MV Cape Ray in Finland and Germany respectively. The Secretariat receives weekly updates on the progress of the destruction of Syrian chemicals weapons and, as instructed by the Council in paragraph 4 of decision EC-M-38/DEC.1 (dated 30 January 2014), reports on such progress through these monthly reports. In the interests of transparency, the OPCW is also reporting on the progress in destruction through its public website.

12. As stated in the previous report, the United Nations Secretary-General's office sent a letter to the Director-General, recommending arrangements for the provision of logistical, administrative, and security support to the OPCW through a partnership with UNOPS, in the wake of the expected transition on 30 September 2014 when the Joint Mission will conclude its work. An agreement between UNOPS, the OPCW, and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the Scope of Requirements concerning future joint activities, was consequently signed on 9 September 2014 during the aforementioned meeting in Beirut. Another meeting was held on 19 September 2014 at the UNOPS Headquarters in Copenhagen, with a view to finalising the Contribution Agreement between UNOPS and the OPCW, taking into account the finances that are currently available to the OPCW. As at the cut-off date of this report, discussions are continuing.

13. With regard to the implementation of additional special monitoring measures as specified in the Note EC-M-43/DG.1/Rev.1 (dated 21 July 2014), initial discussions have been held with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to benefit from its experience. A team from the Secretariat travelled to the IAEA Headquarters in late August to determine the suitability of the IAEA monitoring equipment. Contacts have been established with commercial companies for the purchase, installation, and maintenance of such monitoring equipment.

Supplementary resources

14. As at the cut-off date of this report, the total contribution received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 50.3 million. Contributions have been received from Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

Conclusion

15. Finalising the Cooperation Agreement between the OPCW and UNOPS is being pursued as a matter of priority. At the time of writing this report, discussions are also under way in Beirut, aimed at finalising the selection of companies that will carry out work relating to the destruction of the 12 remaining CWPFs in the Syrian Arab Republic. The OPCW is seeking to finalise these arrangements while remaining within the available budgetary resources. Should, however, the need arise for a review of the adequacy of funds, the Director-General will refer the matter to the Council.

16. The second report of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), including its key findings, was circulated to States Parties on 10 September 2014 (S/1212/2014, dated 10 September 2014). Based on witness testimonies and the data collected by the FFM, the report concludes that this information "constitutes a compelling confirmation that a toxic chemical was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly, in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta in northern Syria. The descriptions, physical properties, behaviour of the gas, and signs and symptoms resulting from exposure, as well as the response of the patients to the treatment, leads the FFM to conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that chlorine, either pure or in mixture, is the toxic chemical in question". The Director-General condemns the use of toxic chemicals as weapons by anyone and considers it expedient for the FFM to continue its work, which will include transcribing the recorded evidence and data that it has obtained, as well as continuing to look into other alleged incidents.

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Letter dated 29 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 16 July 2014 from the President of the Security Council in which the members of the Council requested me to conduct an assessment mission by 1 October 2014 on the progress that Liberia has made towards meeting the conditions set out in Council resolution 1521 (2003) for the termination of sanctions, and to provide recommendations on United Nations and other technical assistance to the Government of Liberia in improving its capacities to undertake the proper management of arms and ammunition, including enacting the necessary legislative frameworks, and facilitating the effective monitoring and management of the border regions between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (S/2014/504). The assessment is attached (see annex).

In the wake of the Ebola virus disease crisis in Liberia, the assessment was carried out from Headquarters in New York principally through video- and teleconferences with relevant interlocutors. The assessment team was composed of representatives of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Panel of Experts on Liberia.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Assessment mission concerning the Liberia sanctions regime

From 5 to 12 September 2014, the assessment team held consultations with the following: the Government of Liberia;[1] representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America to Liberia; the United Nations country team in Monrovia; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in Lomé; the United Nations Office for West Africa; the Peacebuilding Support Office of the United Nations; the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire; and the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The assessment team also met my Special Representative for Liberia and Head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Karin Landgren, and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations.

Key findings

The incremental gains achieved by Liberia over the past 11 years in the consolidation of peace and the rebuilding of State institutions, with the assistance of the United Nations and other international partners, have been accompanied throughout by the targeted sanctions measures contained in Security Council resolution 1521 (2003). The centrality of those measures in ensuring the stability of the country has arguably reduced over time, but so too have the measures themselves, which have been adjusted gradually during the length of the sanctions regime.

In its resolution 1521 (2003), the Security Council expressed its readiness to end the sanctions based on a determination that the separate and specific conditions for each measure were being met. This is the third review that the Council has requested to assess progress made towards meeting the conditions for the termination of sanctions measures (see S/2004/428 and S/2005/376).

The situation in Liberia has changed dramatically since the Security Council requested this assessment. As described in my letter dated 28 August 2014 to the President of the Council (S/2014/644), the Ebola outbreak, which began as a medical emergency, has become more complex. The political, security and humanitarian implications of the epidemic are significant and dynamic. My Special Representative, in her briefing to the Council on 9 September 2014, noted that the Ebola crisis had revealed institutional weaknesses, including in the security sector. Senatorial elections might be postponed until December, and the constitutional reform and decentralization processes have slowed down. The deployment and specific conduct of military personnel with respect to the Ebola crisis, particularly with the implementation of state-of-emergency measures, have also raised some human rights concerns. My Special Representative has also observed challenges in coordination among security agencies in the response to the Ebola virus disease. The epidemic has already significantly weakened previously built Government capacity and has the potential to reverse the gains achieved in the national security sector

[1] The Ministry of National Defence, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, the Executive Protection Service, the National Security Agency, the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, the Liberian national police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of State/Office of the President and the Permanent Mission of Liberia to the United Nations.

reform process. The response to Ebola is overstretching the limited capacity of Liberian security forces, which may be completely overwhelmed if the disease spreads significantly to the security forces themselves.

Against this backdrop of crisis management and fragility, it will be many months before the Government of Liberia and many of its international partners can focus on the recommendations contained herein. In that regard, the Security Council may wish to consider deferring any adjustments to the existing sanctions measures (arms embargo on non-State actors, asset freezes and travel bans) for six months or until the current situation in the country stabilizes and the Government and its partners are better able to implement the capacity-building efforts proposed in the present document. Given the importance of continued monitoring of the border regions, however, should the Council decide to further adjust the current monitoring arrangements for sanctions on Liberia, it may also wish to consider mandating the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire with monitoring cross-border militia and mercenary activities, in particular until the elections to be held in 2015 in Côte d'Ivoire have been completed.

Progress made by Liberia towards meeting the conditions set out in Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) for the termination of sanctions

On 22 December 2003, the Security Council imposed sanctions measures on Liberia in connection with arms, diamonds and timber. It also adopted targeted measures on designated individuals in relation to travel. On 12 March 2004, by its resolution 1532 (2004), the Council decided that States should freeze the assets of designated individuals and entities. The establishment of a new sanctions regime reflected changes on the ground since the sanctions measures contained in Council resolution 1343 (2001) were first imposed: the departure of former President Charles Taylor from Liberia, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and progress made with regard to the peace process in Sierra Leone.

The new sanctions regime reflected the commitment of the Security Council to use sanctions measures to protect the nascent political transition in Liberia; to stem the proliferation of armed non-State actors, including mercenaries, and the trafficking in illegal arms; and to end the illegal exploitation of and illicit trade in natural resources. Targeted travel bans were imposed against designated individuals who constituted a threat to peace and stability in Liberia and the subregion, including senior members of the Government of former President Charles Taylor, their spouses and former members of the Liberian armed forces who retained links to the former President. Targeted financial sanctions (asset freezes) were adopted against individuals and entities misappropriating funds and property to interfere in the restoration of peace and stability in Liberia and the subregion.

Conditioned removal of the measures on natural resources

Through the sanctions measures imposed to protect natural resources, the Security Council was able to effectively encourage the Government of Liberia to undertake specific, time-bound steps to ensure greater accountability and transparency regarding the use of those national assets. The conditional removal of measures related to timber and diamonds and the review by the Council every six months has allowed the Government to demonstrate its political commitment to reforms in this sector. Similarly, the fact that the Panel of Experts continued to

monitor the situation throughout 2013, after the sanctions regarding timber and diamonds were lifted in 2006 and 2007 respectively, highlighted the Council's determination that progress would not be eroded. The institutional reforms required by the Council in the natural resources sector that were ultimately put in place also served to support ongoing work by UNMIL in extending State authority throughout the country.

Timber embargo

Termination of the timber-related embargo was conditional on the ability of the National Transitional Government of Liberia to exert its full authority and control over timber-producing areas. Concomitantly, the Transitional Government needed to undertake all steps necessary to ensure that government revenues from the timber industry were not used to fuel conflict but, rather, to benefit the Liberian people, including for development.

After elections were held successfully and President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was inaugurated in January 2006, the new Government of Liberia demonstrated clear efforts to meet the conditions for lifting sanctions regarding timber. It promulgated Executive Order No. 1, which voided all forest concessions that failed to comply with the rule of law, and created the Forest Reform Monitoring Committee. That piece of legislation addressed concerns raised by both the Panel of Experts and the Liberia Forest Initiative,[2] such as the weak capacity of the Forestry Development Authority to manage the timber sector, lack of control over timber resources and overlapping and undocumented timber concessions.

Citing that effort, on 20 June 2006 the Security Council adopted its resolution 1689 (2006), by which it decided not to renew the prohibition on the importation by States of all round log and timber products from Liberia. The Council also decided to review the decision after a period of 90 days, with a view to reinstating the measures should forestry legislation proposed by the Forest Reform Monitoring Committee not be passed. A reinstatement of the ban on timber was obviated by the passage of the National Forestry Reform Law for the management of the timber sector in October 2006.

Despite the termination of timber-related sanctions, the Security Council continued to monitor natural resource governance by mandating the Panel of Experts to assess the extent to which natural resources were contributing to peace, security and development, rather than instability, in the country. From 2006 to 2013, the Panel identified various natural resource governance issues, notably the illegal allocation of forest resources through the misuse of private use permits. The Panel observed a significant increase in the issuance of private use permits in 2011 and, in 2012, uncovered widespread illegal activity that circumvented the formal concessions process. The fact that the Council paid attention to this issue, even in the absence of targeted measures regarding natural resources, provided the catalyst for Executive Order No. 44 of 4 January 2013, which suspended the issuance of private use permits and any activity related to timber felling or exporting under such licences. In addition, the President commissioned a national investigation, the results of which confirmed the findings of the Panel regarding massive irregularities

[2] A multilateral initiative launched to help the Forestry Development Authority of Liberia to improve governance and transparency in the timber sector.

associated with the allocation of such permits. The investigation led to the suspension of a number of officials in the forestry sector and could result in criminal prosecutions. The Government has instituted a review process that has led to many private use permits being cancelled and the possibility that all such permits may eventually be nullified.

Similarly, through the sanctions regime, the Security Council laid the groundwork for United Nations and other international engagement to tackle issues such as illegal pit sawing, fraud and misappropriation of timber revenues, resolution of land and tenure rights, the commercial concession allocation process and requirements for public participation and transparency, for example through the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Diamond embargo

Termination of the diamond embargo was conditional on the establishment of a transparent, effective and internationally verifiable certificate-of-origin regime for Liberian rough diamonds.

When the civil war ended in 2003, Liberia lacked a functioning system of internal and export control and was therefore unable to participate in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The conditions set out in the sanctions regime paved the way for Liberia to join the Kimberley Process. In September 2004, legislation on diamonds was adopted and, in 2006, regional offices of the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy and a Kimberley-compliant certificate were created. UNMIL helped to train, equip and deploy mineral inspectors and mining agents to implement the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme procedures. After a review by officials of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme concluded that Liberia had made significant progress towards compliance with the Scheme, the Council decided, in its resolution 1753 (2007), to terminate the measures regarding diamonds.

Nevertheless, the Security Council maintained its focus on the diamond sector until the end of 2013 by mandating the Panel of Experts to assess compliance by the Government with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the extent to which diamond extraction was contributing to peace and development, rather than instability.

Notwithstanding the successful application by Liberia to join the Kimberley Process, it was clear that further action would be required in the longer term. This included building capacity and training officials working on the implementation of the Kimberley Process, such as Government Diamond Office staff, mineral inspectors, mining agents and customs, police, immigration, banking and finance officials. Further improvement with regard to the regulation of natural resources was also necessary owing to the remoteness of the sites of operations and the weakness of the infrastructure. In assessing government compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme between 2007 and 2013, the Panel focused on improvements to the internal control system. Because of capacity and infrastructure constraints, diamond trafficking throughout Liberia remains an ongoing concern. The Panel, in cooperation with UNMIL, provided advice on the creation of Kimberley-compliant governance structures, thus establishing a good basis for the Government to make progress in this area.

Amendments to the arms embargo over time

The arms embargo has remained in effect since 2003 but has been adjusted by the Security Council to reflect improvements in the security situation in Liberia and the efforts of UNMIL and bilateral donors to effect meaningful security sector reform. A gradual easing of the embargo on weapons and ammunition supplies to the Government, coupled with ongoing monitoring and inspections, has tested the capacity of the Liberian security sector and highlighted some gaps. It does not appear, however, to have affected the gains already made.

In paragraph 5 of its resolution 1521 (2003), the Security Council expressed its readiness to terminate the measures imposed in relation to the arms embargo and the travel ban when it determined that the ceasefire in Liberia was being fully respected and maintained, that the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and restructuring of the security sector had been completed, that the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were being fully implemented and that significant progress had been made in establishing and maintaining stability in Liberia and the subregion.

The progress made against the above benchmarks has been set out in my earlier reports submitted to the Security Council pursuant to resolutions 1521 (2003) and 1579 (2004) and has also been addressed in the progress reports on UNMIL. Some of the key political and security benchmarks achieved, which have benefited from the effectiveness of the sanctions measures, the focus of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) and the monitoring efforts of the Panel of Experts are set out in the paragraphs below.

On the political front, in the aftermath of war, the National Transitional Government of Liberia, with the support of UNMIL, United Nations agencies and other international partners, successfully implemented key elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. There has been no breach of the ceasefire since the Agreement, which has since lapsed, was signed. National elections were held successfully in November 2005 and the installation of the new Government on 16 January 2006 under President Johnson Sirleaf marked the end of the transitional process.

In terms of security, the weapons collection and demobilization process, which started in December 2003, was concluded successfully in July 2009. A total of 103,019 combatants were demobilized and 6,486,136 rounds of ammunition, 10,996 grenades and 28,314 weapons were collected and destroyed. The two main rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, were both dissolved.

The armed forces of Liberia too were dissolved after the war. The new national armed forces were restructured and the new recruits vetted and trained. The remaining officers of the old armed forces are currently in the process of retiring. The armed forces were under the command of an ECOWAS General from Nigeria until February 2014, when he was replaced by a Liberian Chief of Staff.

The Liberian national police has been reformed, although the personnel of the Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Security Agency, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Executive Protection Service, formerly the Special Security Service, still have not been fully vetted and these institutions have some way to go before that important task will be completed.

In terms of the governance of the security sector, the National Defence Act (2008), for the armed forces, the National Security Reform and Intelligence Act (2011), for the National Security Agency and the Executive Protection Service, and the Drug Enforcement Agency Act (2014) were also enacted. A national security strategy published in 2008 is currently undergoing review and a defence strategy was signed in February 2014.

Given that the armed forces and the national police were undergoing reform, the Security Council decided, by its resolution 1683 (2006), that the arms embargo would no longer apply to limited supplies of weapons and ammunition intended for use by members of the national police and security forces who had been vetted and trained since the inception of UNMIL. This modification to the arms embargo was made to support the new Liberian security forces in assuming greater responsibility for national security, albeit under the continued supervision and subject to the approval of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003).

Shortly thereafter, the Security Council increased the police component of UNMIL to intensify training activities and reduced the mission's military component. Pursuant to its resolution 1683 (2006), it also required the Government of Liberia to mark weapons and ammunition, maintain a registry of them and formally notify the Committee that those steps have been taken. It should be noted, however, that in May 2014 the Panel of Experts reported that it was still not aware of any such notifications by the Government to the Committee. Also in its resolution 1683 (2006), the Council requested UNMIL to inspect inventories of weapons and ammunition obtained to ensure that all such weapons and ammunition were accounted for. To date, UNMIL has submitted 16 weapons inspection reports to the Committee.

By its resolution 1903 (2009), the Security Council decided that arms and related materiel could be supplied to the Government as long as the supplying State notified the Committee, but that the arms embargo would continue to apply to non-State actors. The decision to continue applying the arms embargo against non-State actors was taken at a time when the situation along the border was considered to be unpredictable and the national authorities had limited capacity to control the sea and land borders, leaving Liberia vulnerable to international organized crime networks and trafficking in light weapons. Since 2009, through the various reports of the Panel of Experts and UNMIL, the Council has successfully paid sustained attention to any threat to the peace consolidation process in Liberia emanating from the border region. The arms embargo has further contributed to the consolidation of peace through its deterrent effect, making the illegal import of arms more difficult.

In its most recent resolution on the sanctions regime in Liberia, resolution 2128 (2013), the Security Council decided that the Liberian authorities would have primary responsibility for notifying the Committee of all supplies of arms.

Travel ban and asset freeze

The only measures imposed that have remained unaltered are those concerning the travel ban and the asset freeze. The total number of designated individuals on each list has gradually decreased since 2006, signalling that the threat to the stability of Liberia posed by those individuals has declined. During a meeting of the

assessment team and several national security sector agencies, an official indicated that the Government remained concerned by only one listed individual.

Panel of Experts on Liberia

Just as the Security Council has adjusted the measures imposed under its resolution 1521 (2003) in response to the situation, so too has it altered the size, scope and composition of the Panel of Experts on Liberia. In 2003, the Panel comprised five members with expertise in civil aviation, arms, diamonds, timber, the humanitarian and socioeconomic impact and finance. In July 2007, after Liberia was admitted to the Kimberley Process and one year after the ban on timber was lifted, the Council reduced the size of the Panel to three experts focusing on arms, finance and natural resources respectively. In 2014, the size of the Panel was further adjusted, following the removal of the natural resources component of its monitoring mandate. The Panel is now composed of two members with expertise in arms and finance.

Throughout its existence, the Panel has played an essential role in raising awareness about the sanctions regime, reporting on violations and drawing the attention of the Security Council to developments with the potential to threaten stability in Liberia. It has also monitored progress towards accountability and transparency in natural resources governance, arms management and border security, and has highlighted and made recommendations to close capacity gaps.

Improving the capacity of the Government of Liberia to properly manage arms and ammunition, including by enacting the necessary legislative framework

The security sector reform process in Liberia has yet to be completed. The Government of Liberia should harmonize laws relating to the security sector to ensure that the functions assigned to each agency do not conflict and that no legislation for certain security services remains outstanding. An act setting out the powers, roles and responsibilities of the national police is still pending, although a draft act is currently in the Office of the President, where it is awaiting transmittal to the Legislature. Legislation on the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization is in the early stages of the drafting process. The Uniform Code of Military Justice has been signed by the Minister of Defence and the President, but is still awaiting ratification by the Legislature. During the state of emergency, there were reports that the national police had issued weapons to untrained officers, in violation of resolution 1683 (2006). It should be noted that in the past a number of senior officers have obtained weapons before being properly trained and vetted.

At present, Liberia has no comprehensive legislation regulating weapons and ammunition. The Legislature has ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, which bans the transfers of small arms and light weapons and related materials into or through the territory of States parties unless an exemption is granted. There is little indication, however, that the Convention is being fully implemented by the national authorities. Even if the Council prohibition on the supply of arms to non-State actors were to be adjusted, there would currently be no legal means for the Government to restrict and regulate the purchase and possession of arms.

Some progress has been made recently to address this gap in national legislation. In June 2014, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms

submitted the draft firearms and ammunition control act to the Office of the President through the Ministry of Justice. Immediately following the assessment team's meeting with the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, the draft legislation was forwarded to the Law Reform Commission, which may make its transmittal to the Legislature more likely. It remains doubtful, however, that the Legislature will consider the draft act before the commencement of its next regular session, in 2015.

Regulations on licensing and registration will also be required. Currently no national database of government-owned or privately owned firearms is being maintained, as required by the ECOWAS Convention. Furthermore, while the draft firearms and ammunition control act seeks to address arms management in all sectors, it is unclear whether it would be fully consistent with the legislation already governing some of the security sector agencies. The same uncertainty exists in the case of agencies whose enabling legislation has yet to be enacted.

Effective implementation of any law on arms and ammunition management requires that the responsible agencies have sufficient capacity to undertake their new functions. The draft firearms and ammunition control act places new responsibilities on the national police and the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, both of which lack capacity in terms of human resources and technical expertise. The assessment team received from the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms a detailed needs analysis and workplan outlining core operating and logistical support requirements, training needs for staff, including in the areas of arms marking and tracing, and the need for the establishment of a central arms database. The assessment team requested, but has not received, similar planning documentation from the other security agencies in relation to arms management.

In its resolution 2128 (2013), the Security Council requested the Government of Liberia to carry out a needs-based assessment, with the assistance of UNMIL and any other relevant actors, for any future weapons purchases. The assessment team is aware that the armed forces have conducted a needs-based assessment for ammunition and explosives, but that to date no comprehensive and coordinated assessment involving all security agencies has been carried out. The assessment team is also aware that the national police has expressed a desire to acquire more firearms, as has the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Border Patrol Unit, which at present is unarmed. An increased interest in obtaining firearms by civilian agencies and the diffuse system of managing procurement speaks to the need for coordination among all government agencies responsible for national security.

The marking of weapons and ammunition is a requirement of the Security Council, as set out in resolution 1683 (2006) and reiterated in resolution 1903 (2009). To date, the firearms of the national police, the National Security Agency and the Executive Protection Service are only being marked by hand engraver, while the firearms of the armed forces (by far the largest armoury in Liberia) are marked only with painted numbers, a method considered insufficient by ECOWAS standards. Through a European Union-funded activity in February 2014, ECOWAS provided two marking machines and all the required equipment. The training provided was limited to familiarization, so the Liberian security institutions still lack the technical knowledge to use the machines. UNMIL has proposed carrying out a quick-impact project that would enable the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms to provide further training on how to use the marking machines. That

proposal has been suspended, however, owing to the Ebola crisis, and is unlikely to be taken up again this year.

In its resolution 2138 (2013), the Security Council placed the primary responsibility for notifications regarding future supplies of arms and ammunition on the Government of Liberia. To date, the Government is working on a submission to the Committee which is still incomplete. As the Government assumes full responsibility for weapons and ammunition management, it is important that its ability to better understand the notification process be improved. UNMIL is well placed to support the armed forces and the national police in preparing these notifications to the Committee.

Under the terms of the sanctions set out in Security Council resolutions, UNMIL undertakes quarterly inspections of all armouries established by the Government of Liberia. Those armouries belong to the armed forces, the national police, the Executive Protection Service and the National Security Agency. In general, the armouries belonging to the authorities appear to be better managed than other armouries in the region. The Ministry of National Defence has expressed its readiness to address issues pertaining to the permanent storage of explosives with support from the Mine Action Service of the United Nations, pending the availability of funding for the activity. The Government of Liberia has fully complied and cooperated with UNMIL inspections.

The Office of Disarmament Affairs, through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in cooperation with UNMIL and the Mine Action Service, trained 32 officials of the Government of Liberia and armed forces officers for three days in ammunition management through a joint regional project of the Office of Disarmament Affairs and the European Union. In addition, in an assessment with the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, the Regional Centre identified concrete needs for capacity-building in arms and ammunition management.

Recommendations on United Nations assistance and other technical assistance to the Government of Liberia

In relation to the area of arms and ammunition, the following recommendations should be considered:

(a) **The Government of Liberia must prioritize, as soon as feasible, consideration by the Legislature of the draft firearms and ammunition control act.** No further technical assistance is required to establish the national legislative framework for the proper management of arms and ammunition. **Until legislation, regulations and sufficient capacity are put in place, the Government should, by executive order, introduce a complete moratorium on the importation or possession of small arms by non-State actors;**

(b) **UNMIL should assist the Government, including the Law Reform Commission, to harmonize laws relating to the security sector to ensure that the relevant agencies are assigned appropriate powers, that there are no conflicting functions among the various security agencies and that the most appropriate accountability mechanisms are put in place;**

(c) **International assistance is required to enhance the technical, human resources and administrative capacity of the Liberia National Commission on**

Small Arms, the national police of Liberia and other national security agencies to enable them to carry out their responsibilities under the arms and ammunition management legislation. With this enhanced capacity, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, together with the national police and other national security agencies should, as applicable:

(i) Develop standard operating procedures and regulations for the registration and licensing of small arms;

(ii) Undertake a comprehensive weapons-marking programme involving all national security agencies;

(iii) Develop a central arms database, in accordance with internationally accepted best practice standards, in particular the International Small Arms Control Standards,[3] the General Assembly-mandated International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the recommendations contained in my report on small arms of 22 August 2013 (S/2013/503);[4]

(iv) Conduct a baseline survey to assess national arms and ammunition stockpiles using the Register of Conventional Arms;[5]

(d) **Coordination among the agencies responsible for arms and ammunition management must be further enhanced.** As the government body whose membership comprises all the national security agencies, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms is mandated to coordinate all aspects of government policy and practice regarding arms and ammunition management issues and should act as a central point of contact for potential donors;

(e) **The current system whereby arms embargo notifications are sent to the Committee and inspections are made by UNMIL to accompany the transfer of increased responsibility to the Government of Liberia should be maintained until the current Ebola crisis is brought under control.**

Effective monitoring and management of the border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire

Owing to inter-ethnic and land-related clashes and the uncertainty that followed the mass movement of fighters and refugees during the 2010-2011 Ivorian post-elections violence, the border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire has remained an area of specific focus by the Security Council. In the past, cross-border attacks have been mounted by dissident former fighters with the support of former Liberian militia men who had themselves been displaced during that conflict. Until 2014, there were attacks on the Ivorian side involving Liberian fighters and Ivorian militants. The most significant of the cross-border attacks led to the killing of United Nations peacekeepers in 2012.

While there has been an increase in the number of Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization personnel posted to the borders of Liberia during the past year, the Government still lacks adequately trained personnel and the logistical, communications and mobility capacity to secure its borders. Personnel of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization are deployed at 36 strategic border posts

[3] See www.smallarmsstandards.org.

[4] See, in particular, recommendations 1, 2, 10, 11 and 12.

[5] See www.un-register.org/NationalHoldings/Index.aspx.

and patrol the 176 identified border points along the boundaries between Liberia and its neighbours (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone) to prevent cross-border crimes and enhance border security. The border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire is 716 km long and is heavily forested, making it even more challenging to monitor.

The Liberian coast guard has four small boats with a limited range and is unable to patrol the maritime border with Côte d'Ivoire. It therefore relies on UNMIL to monitor that area. Operations Restore Hope I and Restore Hope II, which were implemented in 2012 and 2013, demonstrated that the Government, even with UNMIL assistance, has limited capacity to mobilize and deploy troops, police and border guards in a coordinated manner to combat the threat posed by Ivorian militia members resident in Liberia and Liberian mercenaries along the border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

The principal intergovernmental security mechanisms are those organized through the Mano River Union and the quadripartite meetings between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and the peacekeeping missions in those two countries. The last quadripartite meeting was held in Monrovia in April 2013; largely as a result of the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease, there has been no meeting in 2014.

The Mano River Union has a long-term strategy of building cross-border cooperation, in coordination with the United Nations Office for West Africa and the United Nations Development Programme, through joint border security and confidence-building units, which undertake cross-border activities. The core function of these units is to enhance cross-border security cooperation and information exchange and to promote cordial relations. While the activities of the units tend to be quite successful in the short term, their sustainability is problematic as they normally cease to operate once the seed money runs out. Activities supported by the units include cultural exchanges, cross-border markets and sports days involving several schools. The Ebola outbreak has led to the suspension of these activities, and it may be difficult to rebuild the momentum later.

The establishment and operationalization of a transnational crime unit in Liberia as part of the West Africa Coast Initiative to counter organized crime, including drug trafficking, has been supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNMIL, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Notwithstanding institutional, operational and logistical challenges to the conduct of stand-alone operations, the Liberian unit has engaged in several joint operations with other law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of Customs and Excise and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. The unit continues to analyse intelligence and to plan and conduct operations with technical support from UNMIL and funding from UNODC.

In its resolution 2162 (2014), the Security Council called upon the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to continue reinforcing cooperation, particularly with respect to the border area, including through increased monitoring, information-sharing and coordinated actions, and to implement the shared border strategy to, inter alia, support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements on both sides of the border. In addition, the Council called upon all United Nations entities in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, within their respective mandates,

capabilities and areas of deployment, to enhance their support for the stabilization of the border area, including through increased inter-mission cooperation and the development of a shared, strategic vision and plan, in support of the Ivoirian and Liberian authorities, and to support the implementation of regional security strategies, including those of the Manu River Union and ECOWAS.

To this end, UNMIL and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) continue to enhance inter-mission cooperation, including with regard to the monitoring of the common border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. The principal mechanism for encouraging cross-border cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL, as well as involving the local civilian authorities and security agencies, has been Operation Mayo, which facilitates cross-border security cooperation between the authorities in both countries. In July 2014, the two missions adopted an inter-mission cooperation framework for engagement for the development of a shared strategy aimed at stabilizing the border in support of the efforts of both national authorities. That framework sets out, inter alia, ways to enhance border security and stabilization, including by curbing the illicit trafficking in drugs and firearms and boosting the capacity of the two Governments to monitor and deter possible activities by armed and illegal elements. With the drawdown of the United Nations military presences in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, it is envisaged that the responsibilities for Operation Mayo will increasingly be taken on by national counterparts. It should be noted that the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of Ivorian ex-combatants on both sides of the border continue to require a framework of cooperation between the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. That operation has also been suspended, however, owing to the Ebola outbreak.

As currently planned, by the end of the third phase of the military drawdown of UNMIL (mid-2015), there will be a reduction of a further 988 military personnel. This will leave UNMIL with 3,631 troops, including three battalions deployed in Monrovia and along the borders with Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. Specifically, the drawdown will include the repatriation of the quick-reaction battalion (650 troops) and military enabling units.[6] Meanwhile, further to resolution 2162 (2014), in the event of a serious deterioration in the security situation on the ground, the UNOCI quick-reaction force could only deploy temporarily to reinforce UNMIL with the sole purpose of implementing its mandate.

The planned drawdown of UNMIL will require the Government of Liberia to increase its security agencies' capacity to take over the security role played by UNMIL in the counties. After drawdown, the Government will have sole responsibility for monitoring and patrolling the Liberian side of the border. Liberian security agencies currently suffer from many operational and logistical issues and it is evident that they severely lack equipment, vehicles, financial support, human resources and planning capacity. This situation means that there is a limited security presence in key border areas.

[6] A decision on this matter has been deferred by the Security Council for three months until 31 December 2014 (see resolution 2176 (2014)).

Recommendations on United Nations assistance and other technical assistance to the Government of Liberia

In relation to the monitoring and management of the border region, the following recommendations should be considered:

(a) Should the Security Council decide to further adjust the current arrangements for monitoring sanctions on Liberia, **it should consider enlarging the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire and expanding its mandate to include cross-border issues;**

(b) **The Government, with the assistance of international partners, should expand the capacity of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and continue to prioritize the deployment of the national police to the border region in line with the present transition arrangements;**

(c) **The Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire should continue to strengthen coordination and information-sharing for border security and stabilization.** A framework for cooperation between the two Governments would be required to address the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of Ivorian ex-combatants on both sides of the border, which has to date been supported by UNMIL and UNOCI together with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.